Difference between revisions of "RFC1108"

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Network Working Group                                            S. Kent
 
Network Working Group                                            S. Kent
 
Request for Comments: 1108                            BBN Communications
 
Request for Comments: 1108                            BBN Communications
Obsoletes: [[RFC1038|RFC 1038]]                                       November 1991
+
Obsoletes: RFC 1038                                        November 1991
  
  
                    U.S. Department of Defense
+
                      U.S. Department of Defense
            Security Options for the Internet Protocol
+
              Security Options for the Internet Protocol
  
  
 
Status of this Memo
 
Status of this Memo
  
This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
+
  This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
+
  community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
+
  Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
+
  Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
+
  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
  
 
Abstract
 
Abstract
  
This RFC specifies the U.S. Department of Defense Basic Security
+
  This RFC specifies the U.S. Department of Defense Basic Security
Option and the top-level description of the Extended Security Option
+
  Option and the top-level description of the Extended Security Option
for use with the Internet Protocol.  This RFC obsoletes [[RFC1038|RFC 1038]]
+
  for use with the Internet Protocol.  This RFC obsoletes RFC 1038
"Revised IP Security Option", dated January 1988.
+
  "Revised IP Security Option", dated January 1988.
  
== DoD Security Options Defined ==
+
1.  DoD Security Options Defined
  
The following two internet protocol options are defined for use on
+
  The following two internet protocol options are defined for use on
Department of Defense (DoD) common user data networks:
+
  Department of Defense (DoD) common user data networks:
  
CF  CLASS  #  TYPE  LENGTH  DESCRIPTION
+
  CF  CLASS  #  TYPE  LENGTH  DESCRIPTION
  
1    0    2  130  var.    DoD Basic Security:  Used to carry the
+
  1    0    2  130  var.    DoD Basic Security:  Used to carry the
                            classification level and protection
+
                                classification level and protection
                            authority flags.
+
                                authority flags.
  
  
1    0    5  133  var.    DoD Extended Security:  Used to carry
+
  1    0    5  133  var.    DoD Extended Security:  Used to carry
                            additional security information as
+
                                additional security information as
                            required by registered authorities.
+
                                required by registered authorities.
  
CF = Copy on Fragmentation
+
  CF = Copy on Fragmentation
  
== DoD Basic Security Option ==
+
2.  DoD Basic Security Option
  
This option identifies the U.S. classification level at which the
+
  This option identifies the U.S. classification level at which the
datagram is to be protected and the authorities whose protection
+
  datagram is to be protected and the authorities whose protection
rules apply to each datagram.
+
  rules apply to each datagram.
  
  
  
  
 +
Kent                                                            [Page 1]
  
 +
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
This option is used by end systems and intermediate systems of an
 
internet to:
 
  
    a.  Transmit from source to destination in a network standard
+
  This option is used by end systems and intermediate systems of an
    representation the common security labels required by computer
+
  internet to:
    security models,
 
  
    bValidate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from
+
        aTransmit from source to destination in a network standard
    the source and delivery to the destination,
+
        representation the common security labels required by computer
 +
        security models,
  
    cEnsure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to
+
        bValidate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from
    the level required by all protection authorities indicated on
+
        the source and delivery to the destination,
    the datagram.  In order to provide this facility in a general
 
    Internet environment, interior and exterior gateway protocols
 
    must be augmented to include security label information in
 
    support of routing control.
 
  
The DoD Basic Security option must be copied on fragmentationThis
+
        cEnsure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to
option appears at most once in a datagram.  Some security systems
+
        the level required by all protection authorities indicated on
require this to be the first option if more than one option is
+
        the datagram.  In order to provide this facility in a general
carried in the IP header, but this is not a generic requirement
+
        Internet environment, interior and exterior gateway protocols
levied by this specification.
+
        must be augmented to include security label information in
 +
        support of routing control.
  
The format of the DoD Basic Security option is as follows:
+
  The DoD Basic Security option must be copied on fragmentation.  This
 +
  option appears at most once in a datagram.  Some security systems
 +
  require this to be the first option if more than one option is
 +
  carried in the IP header, but this is not a generic requirement
 +
  levied by this specification.
  
   +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+
+
   The format of the DoD Basic Security option is as follows:
  |  10000010  |  XXXXXXXX  |  SSSSSSSS  |  AAAAAAA[1]    AAAAAAA0 |
 
  |            |            |            |        [0]            |
 
  +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+
 
    TYPE = 130    LENGTH  CLASSIFICATION        PROTECTION
 
                                  LEVEL              AUTHORITY
 
                                                      FLAGS
 
  
                FIGURE 1.  DoD BASIC SECURITY OPTION FORMAT
+
      +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+
 +
      |  10000010  |  XXXXXXXX  |  SSSSSSSS  |  AAAAAAA[1]    AAAAAAA0 |
 +
      |            |            |            |        [0]            |
 +
      +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+
 +
        TYPE = 130    LENGTH  CLASSIFICATION        PROTECTION
 +
                                    LEVEL              AUTHORITY
 +
                                                          FLAGS
  
=== Type ===
+
                    FIGURE 1.  DoD BASIC SECURITY OPTION FORMAT
  
The value 130 identifies this as the DoD Basic Security Option.
+
2.1.  Type
  
=== Length ===
+
  The value 130 identifies this as the DoD Basic Security Option.
  
The length of the option is variableThe minimum length of the
+
2.2.  Length
option is 3 octets, including the Type and Length fields (the
 
Protection Authority field may be absent).  A length indication of
 
less than 3 octets should result in error processing as described in
 
Section 2.8.1.
 
  
 +
  The length of the option is variable.  The minimum length of the
 +
  option is 3 octets, including the Type and Length fields (the
 +
  Protection Authority field may be absent).  A length indication of
 +
  less than 3 octets should result in error processing as described in
 +
  Section 2.8.1.
  
  
Line 110: Line 112:
  
  
 +
Kent                                                            [Page 2]
  
=== Classification Level ===
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
    Field Length:  One Octet
 
  
This field specifies the (U.S.) classification level at which the
+
2.3Classification Level
datagram must be protected.  The information in the datagram must be
 
protected at this level.  The field is encoded as shown in Table 1
 
and the order of values in this table defines the ordering for
 
comparison purposes.  The bit string values in this table were chosen
 
to achieve a minimum Hamming distance of four (4) between any two
 
valid valuesThis specific assignment of classification level names
 
to values has been defined for compatibility with security devices
 
which have already been developed and deployed.
 
  
"Reserved" values in the table must be treated as invalid until such
+
        Field Length: One Octet
time they are assigned to named classification levels in a successor
 
to this document. A datagram containing a value for this field which
 
is either not in this table or which is listed as "reserved" is in
 
error and must be processed according to the "out-of-range"
 
procedures defined in section 2.8.1.
 
  
A classification level value from the Basic Security Option in a
+
  This field specifies the (U.S.) classification level at which the
datagram may be checked for equality against any of the (assigned)
+
  datagram must be protected.  The information in the datagram must be
values in Table 1 by performing a simple bit string comparison.
+
  protected at this level.  The field is encoded as shown in Table 1
However, because of the sparseness of the classification level
+
  and the order of values in this table defines the ordering for
encodings, range checks involving a value from this field must not be
+
  comparison purposes.  The bit string values in this table were chosen
performed based solely using arithmetic comparisons (as such
+
  to achieve a minimum Hamming distance of four (4) between any two
comparisons would encompass invalid and or unassigned values within
+
  valid values.  This specific assignment of classification level names
the range)The details of how ordered comparisons are performed for
+
  to values has been defined for compatibility with security devices
this field within a system is a local matter, subject to the
+
  which have already been developed and deployed.
requirements set forth in this paragraph.
 
  
                Table 1. Classification Level Encodings
+
  "Reserved" values in the table must be treated as invalid until such
 +
  time they are assigned to named classification levels in a successor
 +
  to this document.  A datagram containing a value for this field which
 +
  is either not in this table or which is listed as "reserved" is in
 +
  error and must be processed according to the "out-of-range"
 +
  procedures defined in section 2.8.1.
  
                      Value              Name
+
  A classification level value from the Basic Security Option in a
 +
  datagram may be checked for equality against any of the (assigned)
 +
  values in Table 1 by performing a simple bit string comparison.
 +
  However, because of the sparseness of the classification level
 +
  encodings, range checks involving a value from this field must not be
 +
  performed based solely using arithmetic comparisons (as such
 +
  comparisons would encompass invalid and or unassigned values within
 +
  the range).  The details of how ordered comparisons are performed for
 +
  this field within a system is a local matter, subject to the
 +
  requirements set forth in this paragraph.
  
                    00000001  -  (Reserved 4)
+
                    Table 1.  Classification Level Encodings
                    00111101  -  Top Secret
 
                    01011010  -  Secret
 
                    10010110  -  Confidential
 
                    01100110  -  (Reserved 3)
 
                    11001100  -  (Reserved 2)
 
                    10101011  -  Unclassified
 
                    11110001  -  (Reserved 1)
 
  
 +
                        Value              Name
  
 +
                        00000001  -  (Reserved 4)
 +
                        00111101  -  Top Secret
 +
                        01011010  -  Secret
 +
                        10010110  -  Confidential
 +
                        01100110  -  (Reserved 3)
 +
                        11001100  -  (Reserved 2)
 +
                        10101011  -  Unclassified
 +
                        11110001  -  (Reserved 1)
  
  
Line 164: Line 168:
  
  
=== Protection Authority Flags ===
+
Kent                                                            [Page 3]
  
    Field Length:  Variable
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
This field identifies the National Access Programs or Special Access
 
Programs which specify protection rules for transmission and
 
processing of the information contained in the datagram.  Note that
 
protection authority flags do NOT represent accreditation
 
authorities, though the semantics are superficially similar.  In
 
order to maintain architectural consistency and interoperability
 
throughout DoD common user data networks, users of these networks
 
should submit requirements for additional Protection Authority Flags
 
to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000, for review and approval.
 
Such review and approval should be sought prior to design,
 
development or deployment of any system which would make use of
 
additional facilities based on assignment of new protection authority
 
flags.  As additional flags are approved and assigned, they will be
 
published, along with the values defined above, in the Assigned
 
Numbers RFC edited by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
 
  
    a.  Field Length: This field is variable in length.  The low-
+
2.4Protection Authority Flags
    order bit (Bit 7) of each octet is encoded as "0" if it is the
 
    final octet in the field or as "1" if there are additional
 
    octets.  Initially, only one octet is required for this field
 
    (because there are fewer than seven authorities defined), thus
 
    the final bit of the first octet is encoded as "0".  However,
 
    minimally compliant implementations must be capable of
 
    processing a protection authority field consisting of at least 2
 
    octets (representing up to 14 protection authorities).
 
    Implementations existing prior to the issuance of this RFC, and
 
    which process fewer protection authority than specified here,
 
    will be considered minimally compliant so long as such
 
    implementations process the flags in accordance with the RFC.
 
    This field must be a minimally encoded representation, i.e., no
 
    trailing all-zero octets should be emitted.  If the length of
 
    this field as indicated by this extensible encoding is not
 
    consistent with the length field for the option, the datagram is
 
    in error and the procedure described in Section 2.8.1 must be
 
    followed(Figure 2 illustrates the relative significance of
 
    the bits within an octet).
 
  
                    0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
+
        Field Length: Variable
                  +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
      High-order |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  Low-order
 
                  +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 
  
                      Figure 2Significance of Bits
+
  This field identifies the National Access Programs or Special Access
 +
  Programs which specify protection rules for transmission and
 +
  processing of the information contained in the datagram.  Note that
 +
  protection authority flags do NOT represent accreditation
 +
  authorities, though the semantics are superficially similarIn
 +
  order to maintain architectural consistency and interoperability
 +
  throughout DoD common user data networks, users of these networks
 +
  should submit requirements for additional Protection Authority Flags
 +
  to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000, for review and approval.
 +
  Such review and approval should be sought prior to design,
 +
  development or deployment of any system which would make use of
 +
  additional facilities based on assignment of new protection authority
 +
  flags.  As additional flags are approved and assigned, they will be
 +
  published, along with the values defined above, in the Assigned
 +
  Numbers RFC edited by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
  
 +
        a.  Field Length: This field is variable in length.  The low-
 +
        order bit (Bit 7) of each octet is encoded as "0" if it is the
 +
        final octet in the field or as "1" if there are additional
 +
        octets.  Initially, only one octet is required for this field
 +
        (because there are fewer than seven authorities defined), thus
 +
        the final bit of the first octet is encoded as "0".  However,
 +
        minimally compliant implementations must be capable of
 +
        processing a protection authority field consisting of at least 2
 +
        octets (representing up to 14 protection authorities).
 +
        Implementations existing prior to the issuance of this RFC, and
 +
        which process fewer protection authority than specified here,
 +
        will be considered minimally compliant so long as such
 +
        implementations process the flags in accordance with the RFC.
 +
        This field must be a minimally encoded representation, i.e., no
 +
        trailing all-zero octets should be emitted.  If the length of
 +
        this field as indicated by this extensible encoding is not
 +
        consistent with the length field for the option, the datagram is
 +
        in error and the procedure described in Section 2.8.1 must be
 +
        followed.  (Figure 2 illustrates the relative significance of
 +
        the bits within an octet).
  
 +
                        0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
 +
                      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
 +
          High-order  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  Low-order
 +
                      +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
  
 +
                        Figure 2.  Significance of Bits
  
  
  
    b.  Source Flags: The first seven bits (Bits 0 through 6) in
 
    each octet are flags.  Each flag is associated with an
 
    authority.  Protection Authority flags currently assigned are
 
    indicated in Table 2.  The bit corresponding to an authority is
 
    "1" if the datagram is to be protected in accordance with the
 
    rules of that authority.  More than one flag may be present in a
 
    single instance of this option if the data contained in the
 
    datagram should be protected according to rules established by
 
    multiple authorities.  Table 3 identifies a point of contact for
 
    each of the authorities listed in Table 2.  No "unassigned" bits
 
    in this or other octets in the Protection Authority Field shall
 
    be considered valid Protection Authority flags until such time
 
    as such bits are assigned and the assignments are published in
 
    the Assigned Numbers RFC.  Thus a datagram containing flags for
 
    unassigned bits in this field for this option is in error and
 
    must be processed according to the "out-of-range" procedures
 
    defined in section 2.8.1.
 
  
    Two protection authority flag fields can be compared for
+
Kent                                                            [Page 4]
    equality (=) via simple bit string matching.  No relative
 
    ordering between two protection authority flag fields is
 
    defined.  Because these flags represent protection authorities,
 
    security models such as Bell-LaPadula do not apply to
 
    interpretation of this field.  However, the symbol "=<" refers
 
    to set inclusion when comparing a protection authority flag
 
    field to a set of such fields.  Means for effecting these tests
 
    within a system are a local matter, subject to the requirements
 
    set forth in this paragraph.
 
  
                  Table 2 - Protection Authority Bit Assignments
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
                            BIT
 
                            NUMBER    AUTHORITY
 
  
                              0       GENSER
+
        b.  Source Flags: The first seven bits (Bits 0 through 6) in
 +
        each octet are flags.  Each flag is associated with an
 +
        authority.  Protection Authority flags currently assigned are
 +
        indicated in Table 2.  The bit corresponding to an authority is
 +
        "1" if the datagram is to be protected in accordance with the
 +
        rules of that authority.  More than one flag may be present in a
 +
        single instance of this option if the data contained in the
 +
        datagram should be protected according to rules established by
 +
        multiple authorities.  Table 3 identifies a point of contact for
 +
        each of the authorities listed in Table 2.  No "unassigned" bits
 +
        in this or other octets in the Protection Authority Field shall
 +
        be considered valid Protection Authority flags until such time
 +
        as such bits are assigned and the assignments are published in
 +
        the Assigned Numbers RFC.  Thus a datagram containing flags for
 +
        unassigned bits in this field for this option is in error and
 +
        must be processed according to the "out-of-range" procedures
 +
        defined in section 2.8.1.
  
                              1        SIOP-ESI
+
        Two protection authority flag fields can be compared for
 +
        equality (=) via simple bit string matching.  No relative
 +
        ordering between two protection authority flag fields is
 +
        defined.  Because these flags represent protection authorities,
 +
        security models such as Bell-LaPadula do not apply to
 +
        interpretation of this field.  However, the symbol "=<" refers
 +
        to set inclusion when comparing a protection authority flag
 +
        field to a set of such fields.  Means for effecting these tests
 +
        within a system are a local matter, subject to the requirements
 +
        set forth in this paragraph.
  
                              2       SCI
+
                      Table 2 - Protection Authority Bit Assignments
  
                              3        NSA
+
                                BIT
 +
                              NUMBER    AUTHORITY
  
                              4       DOE
+
                                0       GENSER
  
                          5, 6       Unassigned
+
                                1       SIOP-ESI
  
                              7       Field Termination Indicator
+
                                2       SCI
  
 +
                                3        NSA
  
 +
                                4        DOE
  
 +
                              5, 6        Unassigned
  
 +
                                7        Field Termination Indicator
  
  
            Table 3 - Protection Authority Points of Contact
 
  
            AUTHORITY            POINT OF CONTACT
 
  
            GENSER                Designated Approving Authority
+
Kent                                                            [Page 5]
                                  per DOD 5200.28
 
  
            SIOP-ESI              Department of Defense
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
                                  Organization of the
 
                                  Joint Chiefs of Staff
 
                                  Attn: J6
 
                                  Washington, DC  20318-6000
 
  
            SCI                  Director of Central Intelligence
 
                                  Attn: Chairman, Information
 
                                  Handling Committee, Intelligence
 
                                  Community Staff
 
                                  Washington, D.C. 20505
 
  
            NSA                  National Security Agency
+
                Table 3 - Protection Authority Points of Contact
                                  9800 Savage Road
 
                                  Attn: T03
 
                                  Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000
 
  
            DOE                  Department of Energy
+
                AUTHORITY            POINT OF CONTACT
                                  Attn:  DP343.2
 
                                  Washington, DC  20545
 
  
=== System Security Configuration Parameters ===
+
                GENSER                Designated Approving Authority
 +
                                      per DOD 5200.28
  
Use of the Basic Security Option (BSO) by an end or intermediate
+
                SIOP-ESI              Department of Defense
system requires that the system configuration include the parameters
+
                                      Organization of the
described below.  These parameters are critical to secure processing
+
                                      Joint Chiefs of Staff
of the BSO, and thus must be protected from unauthorized
+
                                      Attn: J6
modification.  Note that compliant implementations must allow a
+
                                      Washington, DC  20318-6000
minimum of 14 distinct Protection Authority flags (consistent with
 
the Protection Authority field size defined in Section 2.4) to be set
 
independently in any parameter involving Protection Authority flag
 
fields.
 
  
    a. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest
+
                SCI                  Director of Central Intelligence
    Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
+
                                      Attn: Chairman, Information
    classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
+
                                      Handling Committee, Intelligence
    datagram transmitted or received by the system.
+
                                      Community Staff
 +
                                      Washington, D.C. 20505
  
    b. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest
+
                NSA                  National Security Agency
    Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
+
                                      9800 Savage Road
    classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
+
                                      Attn: T03
 +
                                      Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000
  
 +
                DOE                  Department of Energy
 +
                                      Attn:  DP343.2
 +
                                      Washington, DC  20545
  
 +
2.5.  System Security Configuration Parameters
  
 +
  Use of the Basic Security Option (BSO) by an end or intermediate
 +
  system requires that the system configuration include the parameters
 +
  described below.  These parameters are critical to secure processing
 +
  of the BSO, and thus must be protected from unauthorized
 +
  modification.  Note that compliant implementations must allow a
 +
  minimum of 14 distinct Protection Authority flags (consistent with
 +
  the Protection Authority field size defined in Section 2.4) to be set
 +
  independently in any parameter involving Protection Authority flag
 +
  fields.
  
 +
        a. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest
 +
        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
 +
        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
 +
        datagram transmitted or received by the system.
  
    datagram transmitted by the system.
+
        b. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest
 +
        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
 +
        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
  
    c. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set, each member of
 
    which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
 
    all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
 
    in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
 
    in any datagram received by this system.  A compliant
 
    implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
 
    distinct Protection Authority flag fields (each field must be
 
    capable of representing 14 distinct Protection Authority flags)
 
    in this set.  Each element of the enumerated set may be a
 
    combination of multiple protection authority flags.
 
  
    Set elements representing multiple Protection Authorities are
 
    formed by ORing together the flags that represent each
 
    authority.  Thus, for example, a set  element representing
 
    datagrams to be protected according to NSA and SCI rules might
 
    be represented as "00110000" while an element representing
 
    protection mandated by NSA, DOE and SIOP-ESI might be
 
    represented as "01011000".  (These examples illustrate 8-bit set
 
    elements apropos the minimal encodings for currently defined
 
    Protection Authority flags.  If additional flags are defined
 
    beyond the first byte of the Protection Authority Field, longer
 
    encodings for set elements may be required.)
 
  
    It is essential that implementations of the Internet Protocol
+
Kent                                                            [Page 6]
    Basic Security Option provide a convenient and compact way for
 
    system security managers to express which combinations of flags
 
    are allowed.  The details of such an interface are outside the
 
    scope of this RFC, however, enumeration of bit patterns is NOT a
 
    recommended interface.  As an alternative, one might consider a
 
    notation of the form COMB(GENSER,NSA,SCI)+COMB(SIOP-ESI,NSA,SCI)
 
    in which "COMB" means ANY combination of the flags referenced as
 
    parameters of the COMB function are allowed and "+" means "or".
 
  
    d. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set, each member
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991
    of which is a Protection Authority flag field. The set
 
    enumerates all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may
 
    be present in the Protection Authority field of the Basic
 
    Security Option in any datagram transmitted by this system.  A
 
    compliant implementation must be capable of representing at
 
    least 256 distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
 
    Explicit enumeration of all authorized Protection Authority
 
    field flags permits great flexibility, and in particular does
 
    not impose set inclusion restrictions on this parameter.
 
  
The following configuration parameters are defined for each network
 
port present on the system.  The term "port" is used here to refer
 
  
 +
        datagram transmitted by the system.
  
 +
        c. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set, each member of
 +
        which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
 +
        all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
 +
        in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
 +
        in any datagram received by this system.  A compliant
 +
        implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
 +
        distinct Protection Authority flag fields (each field must be
 +
        capable of representing 14 distinct Protection Authority flags)
 +
        in this set.  Each element of the enumerated set may be a
 +
        combination of multiple protection authority flags.
  
 +
        Set elements representing multiple Protection Authorities are
 +
        formed by ORing together the flags that represent each
 +
        authority.  Thus, for example, a set  element representing
 +
        datagrams to be protected according to NSA and SCI rules might
 +
        be represented as "00110000" while an element representing
 +
        protection mandated by NSA, DOE and SIOP-ESI might be
 +
        represented as "01011000".  (These examples illustrate 8-bit set
 +
        elements apropos the minimal encodings for currently defined
 +
        Protection Authority flags.  If additional flags are defined
 +
        beyond the first byte of the Protection Authority Field, longer
 +
        encodings for set elements may be required.)
  
 +
        It is essential that implementations of the Internet Protocol
 +
        Basic Security Option provide a convenient and compact way for
 +
        system security managers to express which combinations of flags
 +
        are allowed.  The details of such an interface are outside the
 +
        scope of this RFC, however, enumeration of bit patterns is NOT a
 +
        recommended interface.  As an alternative, one might consider a
 +
        notation of the form COMB(GENSER,NSA,SCI)+COMB(SIOP-ESI,NSA,SCI)
 +
        in which "COMB" means ANY combination of the flags referenced as
 +
        parameters of the COMB function are allowed and "+" means "or".
  
either to a physical device interface (which may represent multiple
+
        d. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set, each member
IP addresses) or to a single IP address (which may be served via
+
        of which is a Protection Authority flag fieldThe set
multiple physical interfaces)In general the former interpretation
+
        enumerates all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may
will apply and is consistent with the Trusted Network Interpretation
+
        be present in the Protection Authority field of the Basic
of the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TNI) concept of
+
        Security Option in any datagram transmitted by this systemA
a "communications channel" or "I/O device." However, the latter
+
        compliant implementation must be capable of representing at
interpretation also may be valid depending on local system security
+
        least 256 distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
capabilities. Note that some combinations of port parameter values
+
        Explicit enumeration of all authorized Protection Authority
are appropriate only if the port is "single level," i.e., all data
+
        field flags permits great flexibility, and in particular does
transmitted or received via the port is accurately characterized by
+
        not impose set inclusion restrictions on this parameter.
exactly one Classification Level and Protection Authority Flag field.
 
  
    e. PORT-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest
+
  The following configuration parameters are defined for each network
    Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
+
  port present on the system.  The term "port" is used here to refer
    classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
 
    datagram transmitted or received by the system via this network
 
    port.
 
  
    f. PORT-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest
 
    Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
 
    classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
 
    datagram transmitted by the system via this network port.
 
  
    g. PORT-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set each member of
 
    which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
 
    all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
 
    in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
 
    in any datagram received via this port.  A compliant
 
    implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
 
    distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
 
  
    h. PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set each member of
+
Kent                                                            [Page 7]
    which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
 
    all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
 
    in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
 
    in any datagram transmitted via this port.  A compliant
 
    implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
 
    distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
 
  
    i. PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR:  This parameter is a single Protection
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
    Authority flag field assigned to transmitted ICMP error messages
 
    (see Section 2.8).  The PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value is selected
 
    from the set of values which constitute PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.
 
    Means for selecting the PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value within a
 
    system are a local matter subject to local security policies.
 
  
    j. PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL:  This parameter specifies a single
 
    Classification Level and a Protection Authority flag field
 
  
 +
  either to a physical device interface (which may represent multiple
 +
  IP addresses) or to a single IP address (which may be served via
 +
  multiple physical interfaces).  In general the former interpretation
 +
  will apply and is consistent with the Trusted Network Interpretation
 +
  of the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TNI) concept of
 +
  a "communications channel" or "I/O device."  However, the latter
 +
  interpretation also may be valid depending on local system security
 +
  capabilities.  Note that some combinations of port parameter values
 +
  are appropriate only if the port is "single level," i.e., all data
 +
  transmitted or received via the port is accurately characterized by
 +
  exactly one Classification Level and Protection Authority Flag field.
  
 +
        e. PORT-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest
 +
        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
 +
        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
 +
        datagram transmitted or received by the system via this network
 +
        port.
  
 +
        f. PORT-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest
 +
        Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
 +
        classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
 +
        datagram transmitted by the system via this network port.
  
 +
        g. PORT-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set each member of
 +
        which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
 +
        all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
 +
        in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
 +
        in any datagram received via this port.  A compliant
 +
        implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
 +
        distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
  
    (which may be null) to be associated with all unlabelled
+
        h. PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set each member of
    datagrams received via the port.  This parameter is meaningful
+
        which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
    only if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE = FALSE, otherwise receipt of
+
        all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
    an unlabelled datagram results in an error response.
+
        in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
 +
        in any datagram transmitted via this port.  A compliant
 +
        implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
 +
        distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
  
    k. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE:  This parameter is a boolean which
+
        i. PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR:  This parameter is a single Protection
    indicates whether all datagrams received via this network port
+
        Authority flag field assigned to transmitted ICMP error messages
    must contain a Basic Security Option.
+
        (see Section 2.8).  The PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value is selected
 +
        from the set of values which constitute PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.
 +
        Means for selecting the PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value within a
 +
        system are a local matter subject to local security policies.
  
    l. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT:  This parameter is a boolean
+
        j. PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL:  This parameter specifies a single
    which indicates whether all datagrams transmitted via this
+
        Classification Level and a Protection Authority flag field
    network port must contain a Basic Security Option.  If this
 
    parameter is set to FALSE, then PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE should
 
    also be set to FALSE (to avoid communication failures resulting
 
    from asymmetric labelling constraints).
 
  
In every intermediate or end system, the following relationship must
 
hold for these parameters for all network interfaces.  The symbol
 
">=" is interpreted relative to the linear ordering defined for
 
security levels specified in Section 2.3 for the "LEVEL" parameters,
 
and as set inclusion for the "AUTHORITY" parameters.
 
  
        SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >=
 
                PORT-LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN
 
  
        SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN >= PORT-AUTHORITY-IN
+
Kent                                                            [Page 8]
                        and
 
        SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT >= PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT
 
  
=== Configuration Considerations ===
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
Systems which do not maintain separation for different security
 
classification levels of data should have only trivial ranges for the
 
LEVEL parameters, i.e., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-
 
LEVEL-MIN = SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.
 
  
Systems which do maintain separation for different security
+
        (which may be null) to be associated with all unlabelled
classification levels of data may have non-trivial ranges for the
+
        datagrams received via the port.  This parameter is meaningful
LEVEL parameters, e.g., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-
+
        only if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE = FALSE, otherwise receipt of
LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.
+
        an unlabelled datagram results in an error response.
  
=== Processing the Basic Security Option ===
+
        k. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE:  This parameter is a boolean which
 +
        indicates whether all datagrams received via this network port
 +
        must contain a Basic Security Option.
  
For systems implementing the Basic Security Option, the parameters
+
        l. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT:  This parameter is a boolean
PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT and PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE are used to
+
        which indicates whether all datagrams transmitted via this
specify the local security policy with regard to requiring the
+
        network port must contain a Basic Security Option.  If this
presence of this option on transmitted and received datagrams,
+
        parameter is set to FALSE, then PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE should
respectively, on a per-port basis. Each datagram transmitted or
+
        also be set to FALSE (to avoid communication failures resulting
 +
        from asymmetric labelling constraints).
  
 +
  In every intermediate or end system, the following relationship must
 +
  hold for these parameters for all network interfaces.  The symbol
 +
  ">=" is interpreted relative to the linear ordering defined for
 +
  security levels specified in Section 2.3 for the "LEVEL" parameters,
 +
  and as set inclusion for the "AUTHORITY" parameters.
  
 +
          SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >=
 +
                  PORT-LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN
  
 +
          SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN >= PORT-AUTHORITY-IN
 +
                            and
 +
          SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT >= PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT
  
 +
2.6.  Configuration Considerations
  
received by the system must be processed in accordance with the per-
+
  Systems which do not maintain separation for different security
port and system-wide security parameters configured for the system.
+
  classification levels of data should have only trivial ranges for the
 +
  LEVEL parameters, i.e., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-
 +
  LEVEL-MIN = SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.
  
Systems which process only Unclassified data may or may not be
+
  Systems which do maintain separation for different security
configured to generate the BSO on transmitted datagrams. Such
+
  classification levels of data may have non-trivial ranges for the
systems also may or may not require a BSO to be present on received
+
  LEVEL parameters, e.g., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-
datagrams. However, all systems must be capable of accepting
+
  LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.
datagrams containing this option, irrespective of whether the option
 
is processed or not.
 
  
In general, systems which process classified data must generate this
+
2.7Processing the Basic Security Option
option for transmitted datagrams. The only exception to this rule
 
arises in (dedicated or system high [DoD 5200.28]) networks where
 
traffic may be implicitly labelled rather than requiring each
 
attached system to generate explicit labelsIf the local security
 
policy permits receipt of datagrams without the option, each such
 
datagram is presumed to be implicitly labelled based on the port via
 
which the datagram is received.  A per-port parameter (PORT-
 
IMPLICIT-LABEL) specifies the label to be associated with such
 
datagrams upon receipt.  Note that a datagram transmitted in response
 
to receipt of an implicitly labelled datagram, may, based on local
 
policy, require an explicit Basic Security Option.
 
  
==== Handling Unclassified Datagrams ====
+
  For systems implementing the Basic Security Option, the parameters
 +
  PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT and PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE are used to
 +
  specify the local security policy with regard to requiring the
 +
  presence of this option on transmitted and received datagrams,
 +
  respectively, on a per-port basis.  Each datagram transmitted or
  
If an unmarked datagram is received via a network port for which
 
PORT-BSO-REQUIRED = FALSE and PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL = UNCLASSIFIED (NO
 
FLAGS), the datagram shall be processed as though no Protection
 
Authority Flags were set.  Thus there are two distinct, valid
 
representations for Unclassified datagrams to which no Protection
 
Authority rules apply (an unmarked datagram as described here and a
 
datagram containing an explicit BSO with Classification Level set to
 
Unclassified and with no Protection Authority flags set).  Note that
 
a datagram also may contain a Basic Security Option in which the
 
Classification Level is Unclassified and one or more Protection
 
Authority Field Flags are set.  Such datagrams are explicitly
 
distinct from the equivalence class noted above (datagrams marked
 
Unclassified with no Protection Authority field flags set and
 
datagrams not containing a Basic Security Option).
 
  
==== Input Processing ====
 
  
Upon receipt of any datagram a system compliant with this RFC must
+
Kent                                                            [Page 9]
perform the following actions.  First, if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE =
 
TRUE for this port, then any received datagram must contain a Basic
 
Security Option and a missing BSO results in an ICMP error response
 
as specified in Section 2.8.1.  A received datagram which contains a
 
Basic Security Option must be processed as described below.  This
 
  
 +
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
  
 +
  received by the system must be processed in accordance with the per-
 +
  port and system-wide security parameters configured for the system.
  
 +
  Systems which process only Unclassified data may or may not be
 +
  configured to generate the BSO on transmitted datagrams.  Such
 +
  systems also may or may not require a BSO to be present on received
 +
  datagrams.  However, all systems must be capable of accepting
 +
  datagrams containing this option, irrespective of whether the option
 +
  is processed or not.
  
algorithm assumes that the IP header checksum has already been
+
  In general, systems which process classified data must generate this
verified and that, in the course of processing IP options, this
+
  option for transmitted datagrams.  The only exception to this rule
option has been encountered.  The value of the Classification Level
+
  arises in (dedicated or system high [DoD 5200.28]) networks where
field from the option will be designated "DG-LEVEL" and the value of
+
  traffic may be implicitly labelled rather than requiring each
the Protection Authority Flags field will be designated "DG-
+
  attached system to generate explicit labels.  If the local security
AUTHORITY."
+
  policy permits receipt of datagrams without the option, each such
 +
  datagram is presumed to be implicitly labelled based on the port via
 +
  which the datagram is received.  A per-port parameter (PORT-
 +
  IMPLICIT-LABEL) specifies the label to be associated with such
 +
  datagrams upon receipt.  Note that a datagram transmitted in response
 +
  to receipt of an implicitly labelled datagram, may, based on local
 +
  policy, require an explicit Basic Security Option.
  
Step 1. Check that DG-LEVEL is a valid security classification level,
+
2.7.1.  Handling Unclassified Datagrams
        i.e., it must be one of the (non-reserved) values from Table
 
        1.  If this test fails execute the out-of-range procedure in
 
        Section 2.8.1.
 
  
Step 2. Check that PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVELIf this test fails,
+
  If an unmarked datagram is received via a network port for which
        execute out-of-range procedure specified in Section 2.8.2.
+
  PORT-BSO-REQUIRED = FALSE and PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL = UNCLASSIFIED (NO
 +
  FLAGS), the datagram shall be processed as though no Protection
 +
  Authority Flags were setThus there are two distinct, valid
 +
  representations for Unclassified datagrams to which no Protection
 +
  Authority rules apply (an unmarked datagram as described here and a
 +
  datagram containing an explicit BSO with Classification Level set to
 +
  Unclassified and with no Protection Authority flags set).  Note that
 +
  a datagram also may contain a Basic Security Option in which the
 +
  Classification Level is Unclassified and one or more Protection
 +
  Authority Field Flags are set. Such datagrams are explicitly
 +
  distinct from the equivalence class noted above (datagrams marked
 +
  Unclassified with no Protection Authority field flags set and
 +
  datagrams not containing a Basic Security Option).
  
Step 3. Check that DG-AUTHORITY =< PORT-AUTHORITY-IN.  If this test
+
2.7.2. Input Processing
        fails, execute out-of-range procedure specified in Section
 
        2.8.2.
 
  
==== Output Processing ====
+
  Upon receipt of any datagram a system compliant with this RFC must
 +
  perform the following actions.  First, if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE =
 +
  TRUE for this port, then any received datagram must contain a Basic
 +
  Security Option and a missing BSO results in an ICMP error response
 +
  as specified in Section 2.8.1.  A received datagram which contains a
 +
  Basic Security Option must be processed as described below.  This
  
Any system which implements the Basic Security Option must adhere to
 
a fundamental rule with regard to transmission of datagrams, i.e., no
 
datagram shall be transmitted with a Basic Security Option the value
 
of which is outside of the range for which the system is configured.
 
Thus for every datagram transmitted by a system the following must
 
hold: PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVEL >= PORT-LEVEL-MIN and DG-AUTHORITY
 
=< PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.  It is a local matter as to what procedures
 
are followed by a system which detects at attempt to transmit a
 
datagram for which these relationships do not hold.
 
  
If a port is configured to allow both labelled and unlabelled
 
datagrams (PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT = FALSE) to be transmitted, the
 
question arises as to whether a label should be affixed.  In
 
recognition of the lack of widespread implementation or use of this
 
option, especially in unclassified networks, this RFC recommends that
 
the default be transmission of unlabelled datagrams.  If the
 
destination requires all datagrams to be labelled on input, then it
 
will respond with an ICMP error message (see Section 2.8.1) and the
 
originator can respond by labelling successive packets transmitted to
 
this destination.
 
  
To support this mode of operation, a system which allows transmission
+
Kent                                                          [Page 10]
of both labelled and unlabelled datagrams must maintain state
 
information (a cache) so that the system can associate the use of
 
labels with specific destinations, e.g., in response to receipt of an
 
ICMP error message as specified in Section 2.8.1.  This requirement
 
for maintaining a per-destination cache is very much analogous to
 
  
 +
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
  
 +
  algorithm assumes that the IP header checksum has already been
 +
  verified and that, in the course of processing IP options, this
 +
  option has been encountered.  The value of the Classification Level
 +
  field from the option will be designated "DG-LEVEL" and the value of
 +
  the Protection Authority Flags field will be designated "DG-
 +
  AUTHORITY."
  
 +
  Step 1. Check that DG-LEVEL is a valid security classification level,
 +
          i.e., it must be one of the (non-reserved) values from Table
 +
          1.  If this test fails execute the out-of-range procedure in
 +
          Section 2.8.1.
  
that imposed for processing the IP source route option or for
+
  Step 2. Check that PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVELIf this test fails,
maintaining first hop routing information ([[RFC1122|RFC 1122]])This RFC does
+
          execute out-of-range procedure specified in Section 2.8.2.
not specify which protocol module must maintain the per-destination
 
cache (e.g., IP vs.  TCP or UDP) but security engineering constraints
 
may dictate an IP implementation in trusted systems.  This RFC also
 
does not specify a cache maintenance algorithm, though use of a timer
 
and activity flag may be appropriate.
 
  
=== Error Procedures ===
+
  Step 3. Check that DG-AUTHORITY =< PORT-AUTHORITY-IN.  If this test
 +
          fails, execute out-of-range procedure specified in Section
 +
          2.8.2.
  
Datagrams received with errors in the Basic Security Option or which
+
2.7.3Output Processing
are out of range for the network port via which they are received,
 
should not be delivered to user processes. Local policy will specify
 
whether logging and/or notification of a system security officer is
 
required in response to receipt of such datagrams. The following are
 
the least restrictive actions permitted by this protocolIndividual
 
end or intermediate systems, system administrators, or protection
 
authorities may impose more stringent restrictions on responses and
 
in some instances may not permit any response at all to a datagram
 
which is outside the security range of a host or system.
 
  
In all cases, if the error is triggered by receipt of an ICMP, the
+
  Any system which implements the Basic Security Option must adhere to
ICMP is discarded and no response is permitted (consistent with
+
  a fundamental rule with regard to transmission of datagrams, i.e., no
general ICMP processing rules).
+
  datagram shall be transmitted with a Basic Security Option the value
 +
  of which is outside of the range for which the system is configured.
 +
  Thus for every datagram transmitted by a system the following must
 +
  hold: PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVEL >= PORT-LEVEL-MIN and DG-AUTHORITY
 +
  =< PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.  It is a local matter as to what procedures
 +
  are followed by a system which detects at attempt to transmit a
 +
  datagram for which these relationships do not hold.
 +
 
 +
  If a port is configured to allow both labelled and unlabelled
 +
  datagrams (PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT = FALSE) to be transmitted, the
 +
  question arises as to whether a label should be affixed.  In
 +
  recognition of the lack of widespread implementation or use of this
 +
  option, especially in unclassified networks, this RFC recommends that
 +
  the default be transmission of unlabelled datagrams.  If the
 +
  destination requires all datagrams to be labelled on input, then it
 +
  will respond with an ICMP error message (see Section 2.8.1) and the
 +
  originator can respond by labelling successive packets transmitted to
 +
  this destination.
 +
 
 +
  To support this mode of operation, a system which allows transmission
 +
  of both labelled and unlabelled datagrams must maintain state
 +
  information (a cache) so that the system can associate the use of
 +
  labels with specific destinations, e.g., in response to receipt of an
 +
  ICMP error message as specified in Section 2.8.1.  This requirement
 +
  for maintaining a per-destination cache is very much analogous to
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
Kent                                                          [Page 11]
 +
 
 +
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
 +
 
 +
 
 +
  that imposed for processing the IP source route option or for
 +
  maintaining first hop routing information (RFC 1122).  This RFC does
 +
  not specify which protocol module must maintain the per-destination
 +
  cache (e.g., IP vs.  TCP or UDP) but security engineering constraints
 +
  may dictate an IP implementation in trusted systems.  This RFC also
 +
  does not specify a cache maintenance algorithm, though use of a timer
 +
  and activity flag may be appropriate.
 +
 
 +
2.8.  Error Procedures
 +
 
 +
  Datagrams received with errors in the Basic Security Option or which
 +
  are out of range for the network port via which they are received,
 +
  should not be delivered to user processes.  Local policy will specify
 +
  whether logging and/or notification of a system security officer is
 +
  required in response to receipt of such datagrams.  The following are
 +
  the least restrictive actions permitted by this protocol.  Individual
 +
  end or intermediate systems, system administrators, or protection
 +
  authorities may impose more stringent restrictions on responses and
 +
  in some instances may not permit any response at all to a datagram
 +
  which is outside the security range of a host or system.
 +
 
 +
  In all cases, if the error is triggered by receipt of an ICMP, the
 +
  ICMP is discarded and no response is permitted (consistent with
 +
  general ICMP processing rules).
  
 
2.8.1.Parameter Problem Response
 
2.8.1.Parameter Problem Response
  
If a datagram is received with no Basic Security Option and the
+
  If a datagram is received with no Basic Security Option and the
system security configuration parameters require the option on the
+
  system security configuration parameters require the option on the
network port via which the datagram was received, an ICMP Parameter
+
  network port via which the datagram was received, an ICMP Parameter
Problem Missing Option (Type = 12, Code = 1) message is transmitted
+
  Problem Missing Option (Type = 12, Code = 1) message is transmitted
in response.  The Pointer field of the ICMP should be set to the
+
  in response.  The Pointer field of the ICMP should be set to the
value "130" to indicate the type of option missing.  A Basic Security
+
  value "130" to indicate the type of option missing.  A Basic Security
Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set
+
  Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set
to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-
+
  to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-
AUTHORITY-ERROR.
+
  AUTHORITY-ERROR.
  
If a datagram is received in which the Basic Security Option is
+
  If a datagram is received in which the Basic Security Option is
malformed (e.g., an invalid Classification Level Protection Authority
+
  malformed (e.g., an invalid Classification Level Protection Authority
Flag field), an ICMP Parameter Problem (Type = 12, Code = 0) message
+
  Flag field), an ICMP Parameter Problem (Type = 12, Code = 0) message
is transmitted in response.  The pointer field is set to the
+
  is transmitted in response.  The pointer field is set to the
malformed Basic Security Option.  The Basic Security Option is
+
  malformed Basic Security Option.  The Basic Security Option is
included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set to PORT-
+
  included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set to PORT-
LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.
+
  LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.
  
  
Line 639: Line 672:
  
  
 +
Kent                                                          [Page 12]
  
 +
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
==== Out-Of-Range Response ====
 
  
If a datagram is received which is out of range for the network port
+
2.8.2Out-Of-Range Response
on which it was received, an ICMP Destination Unreachable
 
Communication Administratively Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net
 
or Code = 10 for host) message is transmitted in responseA Basic
 
Security Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance
 
Level set to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to
 
PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.
 
  
=== Trusted Intermediary Procedure ===
+
  If a datagram is received which is out of range for the network port
 +
  on which it was received, an ICMP Destination Unreachable
 +
  Communication Administratively Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net
 +
  or Code = 10 for host) message is transmitted in response.  A Basic
 +
  Security Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance
 +
  Level set to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to
 +
  PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.
  
Certain devices in an internet may act as intermediaries to validate
+
2.9Trusted Intermediary Procedure
that communications between two hosts are authorized. This decision
 
is based on the knowledge of the accredited security levels of the
 
hosts and the values in the DoD Basic Security OptionThese devices
 
may receive IP datagrams which are in range for the intermediate
 
device, but are not within the accredited range either for the source
 
or for the destination.  In the former case, the datagram should be
 
treated as described above for an out-of-range option.  In the latter
 
case, an ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication Administratively
 
Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net or Code = 10 for host)
 
response should be transmitted. The security range of the network
 
interface on which the reply will be sent determines whether a reply
 
is allowed and at what level it will be sent.
 
  
== DoD Extended Security Option ==
+
  Certain devices in an internet may act as intermediaries to validate
 +
  that communications between two hosts are authorized.  This decision
 +
  is based on the knowledge of the accredited security levels of the
 +
  hosts and the values in the DoD Basic Security Option.  These devices
 +
  may receive IP datagrams which are in range for the intermediate
 +
  device, but are not within the accredited range either for the source
 +
  or for the destination.  In the former case, the datagram should be
 +
  treated as described above for an out-of-range option.  In the latter
 +
  case, an ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication Administratively
 +
  Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net or Code = 10 for host)
 +
  response should be transmitted. The security range of the network
 +
  interface on which the reply will be sent determines whether a reply
 +
  is allowed and at what level it will be sent.
  
This option permits additional security labelling information, beyond
+
3DoD Extended Security Option
that present in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in an IP
 
datagram to meet the needs of registered authoritiesNote that
 
information which is not labelling data or which is meaningful only
 
to the end systems (not intermediate systems) is not appropriate for
 
transmission in the IP layer and thus should not be transported using
 
this option.  This option must be copied on fragmentation.  Unlike
 
the Basic Option, this option may appear multiple times within a
 
datagram, subject to overall IP header size constraints.
 
  
This option may be present only in conjunction with the Basic
+
  This option permits additional security labelling information, beyond
Security Option, thus all systems which support Extended Security
+
  that present in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in an IP
Options must also support the Basic Security OptionHowever, not
+
  datagram to meet the needs of registered authoritiesNote that
all systems which support the Basic Security Option need to support
+
  information which is not labelling data or which is meaningful only
Extended Security Options and support for these options may be
+
  to the end systems (not intermediate systems) is not appropriate for
selective, i.e., a system need not support all Extended Security
+
  transmission in the IP layer and thus should not be transported using
Options.
+
  this option. This option must be copied on fragmentation. Unlike
 +
  the Basic Option, this option may appear multiple times within a
 +
  datagram, subject to overall IP header size constraints.
  
The top-level format for this option is as follows:
+
  This option may be present only in conjunction with the Basic
 +
  Security Option, thus all systems which support Extended Security
 +
  Options must also support the Basic Security Option.  However, not
 +
  all systems which support the Basic Security Option need to support
 +
  Extended Security Options and support for these options may be
 +
  selective, i.e., a system need not support all Extended Security
 +
  Options.
  
 +
  The top-level format for this option is as follows:
  
  
  
  
 +
Kent                                                          [Page 13]
  
           +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option           November 1991
          |  10000101  |  000LLLLL  |  AAAAAAAA  |  add sec info  |
 
          +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+
 
          TYPE = 133      LENGTH    ADDITIONAL      ADDITIONAL
 
                                    SECURITY INFO    SECURITY
 
                                      FORMAT CODE        INFO
 
  
                FIGURE 3.  DoD EXTENDED SECURITY OPTION FORMAT
 
  
=== Type ===
+
            +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+
 +
            |  10000101  |  000LLLLL  |  AAAAAAAA  |  add sec info  |
 +
            +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+
 +
              TYPE = 133      LENGTH    ADDITIONAL      ADDITIONAL
 +
                                        SECURITY INFO    SECURITY
 +
                                        FORMAT CODE        INFO
  
The value 133 identifies this as the DoD Extended Security Option.
+
                  FIGURE 3.  DoD EXTENDED SECURITY OPTION FORMAT
  
=== Length. ===
+
3.1.  Type
  
The length of the option, which includes the "Type" and "Length"
+
  The value 133 identifies this as the DoD Extended Security Option.
fields, is variable.  The minimum length of the option is 3 octets.
 
  
=== Additional Security Info Format Code ===
+
3.2.  Length.
  
    Length: 1 Octet
+
  The length of the option, which includes the "Type" and "Length"
 +
  fields, is variable. The minimum length of the option is 3 octets.
  
The value of the Additional Security Info Format Code identifies the
+
3.3.  Additional Security Info Format Code
syntax and semantics for a specific "Additional Security Information"
 
fieldFor each Additional Security Info Format Code, an RFC will be
 
published to specify the syntax and to provide an algorithmic
 
description of the processing required to determine whether a
 
datagram carrying a label specified by this Format Code should be
 
accepted or rejected.  This specification must be sufficiently
 
detailed to permit vendors to produce interoperable implementations,
 
e.g., it should be comparable to the specification of the Basic
 
Security Option provided in this RFC.  However, the specification
 
need not include a mapping from the syntax of the option to human
 
labels if such mapping would cause distribution of the specification
 
to be restricted.
 
  
In order to maintain the architectural consistency of DoD common user
+
        Length: 1 Octet
data networks, and to maximize interoperability, each activity should
 
submit its plans for the definition and use of an Additional Security
 
Info Format Code to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C. 20305-2000 for
 
review and approval.  DISA DISDB will forward plans to the Internet
 
Activities Board for architectural review and, if required, a cleared
 
committee formed by the IAB will be constituted for the review
 
process.  Once approved, the Internet Assigned Number authority will
 
assign an Additional Security Info Format Code to the requesting
 
activity, concurrent with publication of the corresponding RFC.
 
  
'''Note:''' The bit assignments for the Protection Authority flags of the
+
  The value of the Additional Security Info Format Code identifies the
 +
  syntax and semantics for a specific "Additional Security Information"
 +
  field.  For each Additional Security Info Format Code, an RFC will be
 +
  published to specify the syntax and to provide an algorithmic
 +
  description of the processing required to determine whether a
 +
  datagram carrying a label specified by this Format Code should be
 +
  accepted or rejected.  This specification must be sufficiently
 +
  detailed to permit vendors to produce interoperable implementations,
 +
  e.g., it should be comparable to the specification of the Basic
 +
  Security Option provided in this RFC.  However, the specification
 +
  need not include a mapping from the syntax of the option to human
 +
  labels if such mapping would cause distribution of the specification
 +
  to be restricted.
  
 +
  In order to maintain the architectural consistency of DoD common user
 +
  data networks, and to maximize interoperability, each activity should
 +
  submit its plans for the definition and use of an Additional Security
 +
  Info Format Code to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000 for
 +
  review and approval.  DISA DISDB will forward plans to the Internet
 +
  Activities Board for architectural review and, if required, a cleared
 +
  committee formed by the IAB will be constituted for the review
 +
  process.  Once approved, the Internet Assigned Number authority will
 +
  assign an Additional Security Info Format Code to the requesting
 +
  activity, concurrent with publication of the corresponding RFC.
  
 +
  Note: The bit assignments for the Protection Authority flags of the
  
  
  
Basic Security Option have no relationship to the "Additional
+
Kent                                                          [Page 14]
Security Info Format Code" of this option.
 
  
=== Additional Security Information. ===
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
    Length:  Variable
 
  
The Additional Security Info field contains the additional security
+
  Basic Security Option have no relationship to the "Additional
labelling information specified by the "Additional Security Info
+
  Security Info Format Code" of this option.
Format Code" of the Extended Security Option.  The syntax and
 
processing requirements for this field are specified by the
 
associated RFC as noted above.  The minimum length of this field is
 
zero.
 
  
=== System Security Configuration Parameters ===
+
3.4.  Additional Security Information.
  
Use of the Extended Security Option requires that the intermediate or
+
        Length: Variable
end system configuration accurately reflect the security parameters
 
associated with communication via each network port (see Section 2.5
 
as a guide). Internal representation of the security parameters
 
implementation dependent.  The set of parameters required to support
 
processing of the Extended Security Option is a function of the set
 
of Additional Security Info Format Codes supported by the system.
 
The RFC which specifies syntax and processing rules for a registered
 
Additional Security Info Format Code will specify the additional
 
system security parameters required for processing an Extended
 
Security Option relative to that Code.
 
  
=== Processing Rules ===
+
  The Additional Security Info field contains the additional security
 +
  labelling information specified by the "Additional Security Info
 +
  Format Code" of the Extended Security Option.  The syntax and
 +
  processing requirements for this field are specified by the
 +
  associated RFC as noted above.  The minimum length of this field is
 +
  zero.
  
Any datagram containing an Extended Security Option must also contain
+
3.5System Security Configuration Parameters
a Basic Security Option and receipt of a datagram containing the
 
former absent the latter constitutes an error.  If the length
 
specified by the Length field is inconsistent with the length
 
specified by the variable length encoding for the Additional Security
 
Info field, the datagram is in error.  If the datagram is received in
 
which the Additional Security Info Format Code contains a non-
 
registered value, the datagram is in error.  Finally, if the
 
Additional Security Info field contains data inconsistent with the
 
defining RFC for the Additional Security Info Format Code, the
 
datagram is in error.  In any of these cases, an ICMP Parameter
 
Problem response should be sent as per Section 2.8.1Any additional
 
error processing rules will be specified in the defining RFC for this
 
Additional Security Info Format Code.
 
  
If the additional security information contained in the Extended
+
  Use of the Extended Security Option requires that the intermediate or
Security Option indicates that the datagram is within range according
+
  end system configuration accurately reflect the security parameters
to the security policy of the system, then the datagram should be
+
  associated with communication via each network port (see Section 2.5
 +
  as a guide).  Internal representation of the security parameters
 +
  implementation dependent.  The set of parameters required to support
 +
  processing of the Extended Security Option is a function of the set
 +
  of Additional Security Info Format Codes supported by the system.
 +
  The RFC which specifies syntax and processing rules for a registered
 +
  Additional Security Info Format Code will specify the additional
 +
  system security parameters required for processing an Extended
 +
  Security Option relative to that Code.
  
 +
3.6.  Processing Rules
  
 +
  Any datagram containing an Extended Security Option must also contain
 +
  a Basic Security Option and receipt of a datagram containing the
 +
  former absent the latter constitutes an error.  If the length
 +
  specified by the Length field is inconsistent with the length
 +
  specified by the variable length encoding for the Additional Security
 +
  Info field, the datagram is in error.  If the datagram is received in
 +
  which the Additional Security Info Format Code contains a non-
 +
  registered value, the datagram is in error.  Finally, if the
 +
  Additional Security Info field contains data inconsistent with the
 +
  defining RFC for the Additional Security Info Format Code, the
 +
  datagram is in error.  In any of these cases, an ICMP Parameter
 +
  Problem response should be sent as per Section 2.8.1.  Any additional
 +
  error processing rules will be specified in the defining RFC for this
 +
  Additional Security Info Format Code.
  
 +
  If the additional security information contained in the Extended
 +
  Security Option indicates that the datagram is within range according
 +
  to the security policy of the system, then the datagram should be
  
  
accepted for further processing.  Otherwise, the datagram should be
 
rejected and the procedure specified in Section 2.8.2 should be
 
followed (with the Extended Security Option values set apropos the
 
Additional Security Info Format Code port security parameters).
 
  
As with the Basic Security Option, it will not be possible in a
+
Kent                                                          [Page 15]
general internet environment for intermediate systems to provide
+
 
routing control for datagrams based on the labels contained in the
+
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
Extended Security Option until such time as interior and exterior
+
 
gateway routing protocols are enhanced to process such labels.
+
 
 +
  accepted for further processing.  Otherwise, the datagram should be
 +
  rejected and the procedure specified in Section 2.8.2 should be
 +
  followed (with the Extended Security Option values set apropos the
 +
  Additional Security Info Format Code port security parameters).
 +
 
 +
  As with the Basic Security Option, it will not be possible in a
 +
  general internet environment for intermediate systems to provide
 +
  routing control for datagrams based on the labels contained in the
 +
  Extended Security Option until such time as interior and exterior
 +
  gateway routing protocols are enhanced to process such labels.
  
 
References
 
References
  
[DoD 5200.28]  Department of Defense Directive 5200.28, "Security
+
  [DoD 5200.28]  Department of Defense Directive 5200.28, "Security
              Requirements for Automated Information Systems," 21
+
                  Requirements for Automated Information Systems," 21
              March 1988.
+
                  March 1988.
  
 
Security Considerations
 
Security Considerations
  
The focus of this RFC is the definition of formats and processing
+
  The focus of this RFC is the definition of formats and processing
conventions to support security labels for data contained in IP
+
  conventions to support security labels for data contained in IP
datagrams, thus a variety of security issues must be considered
+
  datagrams, thus a variety of security issues must be considered
carefully when making use of these options.  It is not possible to
+
  carefully when making use of these options.  It is not possible to
address all of the security considerations which affect correct
+
  address all of the security considerations which affect correct
implementation and use of these options, however the following
+
  implementation and use of these options, however the following
paragraph highglights some of these issues.
+
  paragraph highglights some of these issues.
  
Correct implementation and operation of the software and hardware
+
  Correct implementation and operation of the software and hardware
which processes these options is essential to their effective use.
+
  which processes these options is essential to their effective use.
Means for achieving confidence in such correct implementation and
+
  Means for achieving confidence in such correct implementation and
operation are outside of the scope of this RFC.  The options
+
  operation are outside of the scope of this RFC.  The options
themselves incorporate no facilities to ensure the integrity of the
+
  themselves incorporate no facilities to ensure the integrity of the
security labels in transit (other than the IP checksum mechanism),
+
  security labels in transit (other than the IP checksum mechanism),
thus appropriate technology must be employed whenever datagrams
+
  thus appropriate technology must be employed whenever datagrams
containing these options transit "hostile" communication
+
  containing these options transit "hostile" communication
environments.  Careful, secure management of the configuration
+
  environments.  Careful, secure management of the configuration
variables associated with each system making use of these options is
+
  variables associated with each system making use of these options is
essential if the options are to provide the intended security
+
  essential if the options are to provide the intended security
functionality.
+
  functionality.
  
  
Line 851: Line 896:
  
  
 +
Kent                                                          [Page 16]
 +
 +
RFC 1108                U.S. DOD Security Option          November 1991
  
  
 
Author's Address
 
Author's Address
  
Stephen Kent
+
  Stephen Kent
BBN Communications
+
  BBN Communications
150 CambridgePark Drive
+
  150 CambridgePark Drive
Cambridge, MA  02140
+
  Cambridge, MA  02140
 +
 
 +
  Phone: (617) 873-3988
 +
 
 +
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
 +
 
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Kent                                                          [Page 17]

Revision as of 22:51, 22 September 2020




Network Working Group S. Kent Request for Comments: 1108 BBN Communications Obsoletes: RFC 1038 November 1991


                      U.S. Department of Defense
              Security Options for the Internet Protocol


Status of this Memo

  This RFC specifies an IAB standards track protocol for the Internet
  community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.
  Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
  Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
  Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract

  This RFC specifies the U.S. Department of Defense Basic Security
  Option and the top-level description of the Extended Security Option
  for use with the Internet Protocol.  This RFC obsoletes RFC 1038
  "Revised IP Security Option", dated January 1988.

1. DoD Security Options Defined

  The following two internet protocol options are defined for use on
  Department of Defense (DoD) common user data networks:
  CF  CLASS  #  TYPE  LENGTH   DESCRIPTION
  1     0    2   130   var.    DoD Basic Security:  Used to carry the
                               classification level and protection
                               authority flags.


  1     0    5   133   var.    DoD Extended Security:  Used to carry
                               additional security information as
                               required by registered authorities.
  CF = Copy on Fragmentation

2. DoD Basic Security Option

  This option identifies the U.S. classification level at which the
  datagram is to be protected and the authorities whose protection
  rules apply to each datagram.



Kent [Page 1]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


  This option is used by end systems and intermediate systems of an
  internet to:
       a.  Transmit from source to destination in a network standard
       representation the common security labels required by computer
       security models,
       b.  Validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from
       the source and delivery to the destination,
       c.  Ensure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to
       the level required by all protection authorities indicated on
       the datagram.  In order to provide this facility in a general
       Internet environment, interior and exterior gateway protocols
       must be augmented to include security label information in
       support of routing control.
  The DoD Basic Security option must be copied on fragmentation.  This
  option appears at most once in a datagram.  Some security systems
  require this to be the first option if more than one option is
  carried in the IP header, but this is not a generic requirement
  levied by this specification.
  The format of the DoD Basic Security option is as follows:
     +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+
     |  10000010  |  XXXXXXXX  |  SSSSSSSS  |  AAAAAAA[1]    AAAAAAA0 |
     |            |            |            |         [0]             |
     +------------+------------+------------+-------------//----------+
       TYPE = 130     LENGTH   CLASSIFICATION         PROTECTION
                                    LEVEL              AUTHORITY
                                                         FLAGS
                   FIGURE 1.  DoD BASIC SECURITY OPTION FORMAT

2.1. Type

  The value 130 identifies this as the DoD Basic Security Option.

2.2. Length

  The length of the option is variable.  The minimum length of the
  option is 3 octets, including the Type and Length fields (the
  Protection Authority field may be absent).  A length indication of
  less than 3 octets should result in error processing as described in
  Section 2.8.1.



Kent [Page 2]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


2.3. Classification Level

       Field Length:  One Octet
  This field specifies the (U.S.) classification level at which the
  datagram must be protected.  The information in the datagram must be
  protected at this level.  The field is encoded as shown in Table 1
  and the order of values in this table defines the ordering for
  comparison purposes.  The bit string values in this table were chosen
  to achieve a minimum Hamming distance of four (4) between any two
  valid values.  This specific assignment of classification level names
  to values has been defined for compatibility with security devices
  which have already been developed and deployed.
  "Reserved" values in the table must be treated as invalid until such
  time they are assigned to named classification levels in a successor
  to this document.  A datagram containing a value for this field which
  is either not in this table or which is listed as "reserved" is in
  error and must be processed according to the "out-of-range"
  procedures defined in section 2.8.1.
  A classification level value from the Basic Security Option in a
  datagram may be checked for equality against any of the (assigned)
  values in Table 1 by performing a simple bit string comparison.
  However, because of the sparseness of the classification level
  encodings, range checks involving a value from this field must not be
  performed based solely using arithmetic comparisons (as such
  comparisons would encompass invalid and or unassigned values within
  the range).  The details of how ordered comparisons are performed for
  this field within a system is a local matter, subject to the
  requirements set forth in this paragraph.
                   Table 1.  Classification Level Encodings
                        Value              Name
                       00000001   -   (Reserved 4)
                       00111101   -   Top Secret
                       01011010   -   Secret
                       10010110   -   Confidential
                       01100110   -   (Reserved 3)
                       11001100   -   (Reserved 2)
                       10101011   -   Unclassified
                       11110001   -   (Reserved 1)




Kent [Page 3]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


2.4. Protection Authority Flags

       Field Length:  Variable
  This field identifies the National Access Programs or Special Access
  Programs which specify protection rules for transmission and
  processing of the information contained in the datagram.  Note that
  protection authority flags do NOT represent accreditation
  authorities, though the semantics are superficially similar.  In
  order to maintain architectural consistency and interoperability
  throughout DoD common user data networks, users of these networks
  should submit requirements for additional Protection Authority Flags
  to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000, for review and approval.
  Such review and approval should be sought prior to design,
  development or deployment of any system which would make use of
  additional facilities based on assignment of new protection authority
  flags.  As additional flags are approved and assigned, they will be
  published, along with the values defined above, in the Assigned
  Numbers RFC edited by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).
       a.  Field Length: This field is variable in length.  The low-
       order bit (Bit 7) of each octet is encoded as "0" if it is the
       final octet in the field or as "1" if there are additional
       octets.  Initially, only one octet is required for this field
       (because there are fewer than seven authorities defined), thus
       the final bit of the first octet is encoded as "0".  However,
       minimally compliant implementations must be capable of
       processing a protection authority field consisting of at least 2
       octets (representing up to 14 protection authorities).
       Implementations existing prior to the issuance of this RFC, and
       which process fewer protection authority than specified here,
       will be considered minimally compliant so long as such
       implementations process the flags in accordance with the RFC.
       This field must be a minimally encoded representation, i.e., no
       trailing all-zero octets should be emitted.  If the length of
       this field as indicated by this extensible encoding is not
       consistent with the length field for the option, the datagram is
       in error and the procedure described in Section 2.8.1 must be
       followed.  (Figure 2 illustrates the relative significance of
       the bits within an octet).
                       0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
         High-order  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |  Low-order
                     +---+---+---+---+---+---+---+---+
                        Figure 2.  Significance of Bits



Kent [Page 4]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


       b.  Source Flags: The first seven bits (Bits 0 through 6) in
       each octet are flags.  Each flag is associated with an
       authority.  Protection Authority flags currently assigned are
       indicated in Table 2.  The bit corresponding to an authority is
       "1" if the datagram is to be protected in accordance with the
       rules of that authority.  More than one flag may be present in a
       single instance of this option if the data contained in the
       datagram should be protected according to rules established by
       multiple authorities.  Table 3 identifies a point of contact for
       each of the authorities listed in Table 2.  No "unassigned" bits
       in this or other octets in the Protection Authority Field shall
       be considered valid Protection Authority flags until such time
       as such bits are assigned and the assignments are published in
       the Assigned Numbers RFC.  Thus a datagram containing flags for
       unassigned bits in this field for this option is in error and
       must be processed according to the "out-of-range" procedures
       defined in section 2.8.1.
       Two protection authority flag fields can be compared for
       equality (=) via simple bit string matching.  No relative
       ordering between two protection authority flag fields is
       defined.  Because these flags represent protection authorities,
       security models such as Bell-LaPadula do not apply to
       interpretation of this field.  However, the symbol "=<" refers
       to set inclusion when comparing a protection authority flag
       field to a set of such fields.  Means for effecting these tests
       within a system are a local matter, subject to the requirements
       set forth in this paragraph.
                     Table 2 - Protection Authority Bit Assignments
                               BIT
                              NUMBER     AUTHORITY
                                0        GENSER
                                1        SIOP-ESI
                                2        SCI
                                3        NSA
                                4        DOE
                             5, 6        Unassigned
                                7        Field Termination Indicator



Kent [Page 5]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


               Table 3 - Protection Authority Points of Contact
               AUTHORITY             POINT OF CONTACT
               GENSER                Designated Approving Authority
                                     per DOD 5200.28
               SIOP-ESI              Department of Defense
                                     Organization of the
                                     Joint Chiefs of Staff
                                     Attn: J6
                                     Washington, DC  20318-6000
               SCI                   Director of Central Intelligence
                                     Attn: Chairman, Information
                                     Handling Committee, Intelligence
                                     Community Staff
                                     Washington, D.C. 20505
               NSA                   National Security Agency
                                     9800 Savage Road
                                     Attn: T03
                                     Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000
               DOE                   Department of Energy
                                     Attn:  DP343.2
                                     Washington, DC  20545

2.5. System Security Configuration Parameters

  Use of the Basic Security Option (BSO) by an end or intermediate
  system requires that the system configuration include the parameters
  described below.  These parameters are critical to secure processing
  of the BSO, and thus must be protected from unauthorized
  modification.  Note that compliant implementations must allow a
  minimum of 14 distinct Protection Authority flags (consistent with
  the Protection Authority field size defined in Section 2.4) to be set
  independently in any parameter involving Protection Authority flag
  fields.
       a. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest
       Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
       classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
       datagram transmitted or received by the system.
       b. SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest
       Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
       classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any


Kent [Page 6]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


       datagram transmitted by the system.
       c. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set, each member of
       which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
       all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
       in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
       in any datagram received by this system.  A compliant
       implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
       distinct Protection Authority flag fields (each field must be
       capable of representing 14 distinct Protection Authority flags)
       in this set.  Each element of the enumerated set may be a
       combination of multiple protection authority flags.
       Set elements representing multiple Protection Authorities are
       formed by ORing together the flags that represent each
       authority.  Thus, for example, a set  element representing
       datagrams to be protected according to NSA and SCI rules might
       be represented as "00110000" while an element representing
       protection mandated by NSA, DOE and SIOP-ESI might be
       represented as "01011000".  (These examples illustrate 8-bit set
       elements apropos the minimal encodings for currently defined
       Protection Authority flags.  If additional flags are defined
       beyond the first byte of the Protection Authority Field, longer
       encodings for set elements may be required.)
       It is essential that implementations of the Internet Protocol
       Basic Security Option provide a convenient and compact way for
       system security managers to express which combinations of flags
       are allowed.  The details of such an interface are outside the
       scope of this RFC, however, enumeration of bit patterns is NOT a
       recommended interface.  As an alternative, one might consider a
       notation of the form COMB(GENSER,NSA,SCI)+COMB(SIOP-ESI,NSA,SCI)
       in which "COMB" means ANY combination of the flags referenced as
       parameters of the COMB function are allowed and "+" means "or".
       d. SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set, each member
       of which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set
       enumerates all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may
       be present in the Protection Authority field of the Basic
       Security Option in any datagram transmitted by this system.  A
       compliant implementation must be capable of representing at
       least 256 distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
       Explicit enumeration of all authorized Protection Authority
       field flags permits great flexibility, and in particular does
       not impose set inclusion restrictions on this parameter.
  The following configuration parameters are defined for each network
  port present on the system.  The term "port" is used here to refer


Kent [Page 7]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


  either to a physical device interface (which may represent multiple
  IP addresses) or to a single IP address (which may be served via
  multiple physical interfaces).  In general the former interpretation
  will apply and is consistent with the Trusted Network Interpretation
  of the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria (TNI) concept of
  a "communications channel" or "I/O device."  However, the latter
  interpretation also may be valid depending on local system security
  capabilities.  Note that some combinations of port parameter values
  are appropriate only if the port is "single level," i.e., all data
  transmitted or received via the port is accurately characterized by
  exactly one Classification Level and Protection Authority Flag field.
       e. PORT-LEVEL-MAX: This parameter specifies the highest
       Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
       classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
       datagram transmitted or received by the system via this network
       port.
       f. PORT-LEVEL-MIN: This parameter specifies the lowest
       Classification Level (see Table 1) which may be present in the
       classification level field of the Basic Security Option in any
       datagram transmitted by the system via this network port.
       g. PORT-AUTHORITY-IN:  This parameter is a set each member of
       which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
       all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
       in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
       in any datagram received via this port.  A compliant
       implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
       distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
       h. PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT:  This parameter is a set each member of
       which is a Protection Authority flag field.  The set enumerates
       all of the Protection Authority flag fields which may be present
       in the Protection Authority field of the Basic Security Option
       in any datagram transmitted via this port.  A compliant
       implementation must be capable of representing at least 256
       distinct Protection Authority flag fields in this set.
       i. PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR:  This parameter is a single Protection
       Authority flag field assigned to transmitted ICMP error messages
       (see Section 2.8).  The PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value is selected
       from the set of values which constitute PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.
       Means for selecting the PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR value within a
       system are a local matter subject to local security policies.
       j. PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL:  This parameter specifies a single
       Classification Level and a Protection Authority flag field


Kent [Page 8]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


       (which may be null) to be associated with all unlabelled
       datagrams received via the port.  This parameter is meaningful
       only if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE = FALSE, otherwise receipt of
       an unlabelled datagram results in an error response.
       k. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE:  This parameter is a boolean which
       indicates whether all datagrams received via this network port
       must contain a Basic Security Option.
       l. PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT:  This parameter is a boolean
       which indicates whether all datagrams transmitted via this
       network port must contain a Basic Security Option.   If this
       parameter is set to FALSE, then PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE should
       also be set to FALSE (to avoid communication failures resulting
       from asymmetric labelling constraints).
  In every intermediate or end system, the following relationship must
  hold for these parameters for all network interfaces.  The symbol
  ">=" is interpreted relative to the linear ordering defined for
  security levels specified in Section 2.3 for the "LEVEL" parameters,
  and as set inclusion for the "AUTHORITY" parameters.
          SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >=
                  PORT-LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN
          SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-IN >= PORT-AUTHORITY-IN
                           and
          SYSTEM-AUTHORITY-OUT >= PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT

2.6. Configuration Considerations

  Systems which do not maintain separation for different security
  classification levels of data should have only trivial ranges for the
  LEVEL parameters, i.e., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-LEVEL-MAX = PORT-
  LEVEL-MIN = SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.
  Systems which do maintain separation for different security
  classification levels of data may have non-trivial ranges for the
  LEVEL parameters, e.g., SYSTEM-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= PORT-
  LEVEL-MIN >= SYSTEM-LEVEL-MIN.

2.7. Processing the Basic Security Option

  For systems implementing the Basic Security Option, the parameters
  PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT and PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE are used to
  specify the local security policy with regard to requiring the
  presence of this option on transmitted and received datagrams,
  respectively, on a per-port basis.  Each datagram transmitted or


Kent [Page 9]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


  received by the system must be processed in accordance with the per-
  port and system-wide security parameters configured for the system.
  Systems which process only Unclassified data may or may not be
  configured to generate the BSO on transmitted datagrams.  Such
  systems also may or may not require a BSO to be present on received
  datagrams.  However, all systems must be capable of accepting
  datagrams containing this option, irrespective of whether the option
  is processed or not.
  In general, systems which process classified data must generate this
  option for transmitted datagrams.  The only exception to this rule
  arises in (dedicated or system high [DoD 5200.28]) networks where
  traffic may be implicitly labelled rather than requiring each
  attached system to generate explicit labels.  If the local security
  policy permits receipt of datagrams without the option, each such
  datagram is presumed to be implicitly labelled based on the port via
  which the datagram is received.  A per-port parameter (PORT-
  IMPLICIT-LABEL) specifies the label to be associated with such
  datagrams upon receipt.  Note that a datagram transmitted in response
  to receipt of an implicitly labelled datagram, may, based on local
  policy, require an explicit Basic Security Option.

2.7.1. Handling Unclassified Datagrams

  If an unmarked datagram is received via a network port for which
  PORT-BSO-REQUIRED = FALSE and PORT-IMPLICIT-LABEL = UNCLASSIFIED (NO
  FLAGS), the datagram shall be processed as though no Protection
  Authority Flags were set.  Thus there are two distinct, valid
  representations for Unclassified datagrams to which no Protection
  Authority rules apply (an unmarked datagram as described here and a
  datagram containing an explicit BSO with Classification Level set to
  Unclassified and with no Protection Authority flags set).  Note that
  a datagram also may contain a Basic Security Option in which the
  Classification Level is Unclassified and one or more Protection
  Authority Field Flags are set.  Such datagrams are explicitly
  distinct from the equivalence class noted above (datagrams marked
  Unclassified with no Protection Authority field flags set and
  datagrams not containing a Basic Security Option).

2.7.2. Input Processing

  Upon receipt of any datagram a system compliant with this RFC must
  perform the following actions.  First, if PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-RECEIVE =
  TRUE for this port, then any received datagram must contain a Basic
  Security Option and a missing BSO results in an ICMP error response
  as specified in Section 2.8.1.  A received datagram which contains a
  Basic Security Option must be processed as described below.  This


Kent [Page 10]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


  algorithm assumes that the IP header checksum has already been
  verified and that, in the course of processing IP options, this
  option has been encountered.  The value of the Classification Level
  field from the option will be designated "DG-LEVEL" and the value of
  the Protection Authority Flags field will be designated "DG-
  AUTHORITY."
  Step 1. Check that DG-LEVEL is a valid security classification level,
          i.e., it must be one of the (non-reserved) values from Table
          1.  If this test fails execute the out-of-range procedure in
          Section 2.8.1.
  Step 2. Check that PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVEL.  If this test fails,
          execute out-of-range procedure specified in Section 2.8.2.
  Step 3. Check that DG-AUTHORITY =< PORT-AUTHORITY-IN.  If this test
          fails, execute out-of-range procedure specified in Section
          2.8.2.

2.7.3. Output Processing

  Any system which implements the Basic Security Option must adhere to
  a fundamental rule with regard to transmission of datagrams, i.e., no
  datagram shall be transmitted with a Basic Security Option the value
  of which is outside of the range for which the system is configured.
  Thus for every datagram transmitted by a system the following must
  hold: PORT-LEVEL-MAX >= DG-LEVEL >= PORT-LEVEL-MIN and DG-AUTHORITY
  =< PORT-AUTHORITY-OUT.  It is a local matter as to what procedures
  are followed by a system which detects at attempt to transmit a
  datagram for which these relationships do not hold.
  If a port is configured to allow both labelled and unlabelled
  datagrams (PORT-BSO-REQUIRED-TRANSMIT = FALSE) to be transmitted, the
  question arises as to whether a label should be affixed.  In
  recognition of the lack of widespread implementation or use of this
  option, especially in unclassified networks, this RFC recommends that
  the default be transmission of unlabelled datagrams.  If the
  destination requires all datagrams to be labelled on input, then it
  will respond with an ICMP error message (see Section 2.8.1) and the
  originator can respond by labelling successive packets transmitted to
  this destination.
  To support this mode of operation, a system which allows transmission
  of both labelled and unlabelled datagrams must maintain state
  information (a cache) so that the system can associate the use of
  labels with specific destinations, e.g., in response to receipt of an
  ICMP error message as specified in Section 2.8.1.  This requirement
  for maintaining a per-destination cache is very much analogous to


Kent [Page 11]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


  that imposed for processing the IP source route option or for
  maintaining first hop routing information (RFC 1122).  This RFC does
  not specify which protocol module must maintain the per-destination
  cache (e.g., IP vs.  TCP or UDP) but security engineering constraints
  may dictate an IP implementation in trusted systems.  This RFC also
  does not specify a cache maintenance algorithm, though use of a timer
  and activity flag may be appropriate.

2.8. Error Procedures

  Datagrams received with errors in the Basic Security Option or which
  are out of range for the network port via which they are received,
  should not be delivered to user processes.  Local policy will specify
  whether logging and/or notification of a system security officer is
  required in response to receipt of such datagrams.  The following are
  the least restrictive actions permitted by this protocol.  Individual
  end or intermediate systems, system administrators, or protection
  authorities may impose more stringent restrictions on responses and
  in some instances may not permit any response at all to a datagram
  which is outside the security range of a host or system.
  In all cases, if the error is triggered by receipt of an ICMP, the
  ICMP is discarded and no response is permitted (consistent with
  general ICMP processing rules).

2.8.1.Parameter Problem Response

  If a datagram is received with no Basic Security Option and the
  system security configuration parameters require the option on the
  network port via which the datagram was received, an ICMP Parameter
  Problem Missing Option (Type = 12, Code = 1) message is transmitted
  in response.  The Pointer field of the ICMP should be set to the
  value "130" to indicate the type of option missing.  A Basic Security
  Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set
  to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-
  AUTHORITY-ERROR.
  If a datagram is received in which the Basic Security Option is
  malformed (e.g., an invalid Classification Level Protection Authority
  Flag field), an ICMP Parameter Problem (Type = 12, Code = 0) message
  is transmitted in response.  The pointer field is set to the
  malformed Basic Security Option.  The Basic Security Option is
  included in the response datagram with Clearance Level set to PORT-
  LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.




Kent [Page 12]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


2.8.2. Out-Of-Range Response

  If a datagram is received which is out of range for the network port
  on which it was received, an ICMP Destination Unreachable
  Communication Administratively Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net
  or Code = 10 for host) message is transmitted in response.  A Basic
  Security Option is included in the response datagram with Clearance
  Level set to PORT-LEVEL-MIN and Protection Authority Flags set to
  PORT-AUTHORITY-ERROR.

2.9. Trusted Intermediary Procedure

  Certain devices in an internet may act as intermediaries to validate
  that communications between two hosts are authorized.  This decision
  is based on the knowledge of the accredited security levels of the
  hosts and the values in the DoD Basic Security Option.  These devices
  may receive IP datagrams which are in range for the intermediate
  device, but are not within the accredited range either for the source
  or for the destination.  In the former case, the datagram should be
  treated as described above for an out-of-range option.  In the latter
  case, an ICMP Destination Unreachable Communication Administratively
  Prohibited (Type = 3, Code = 9 for net or Code = 10 for host)
  response should be transmitted. The security range of the network
  interface on which the reply will be sent determines whether a reply
  is allowed and at what level it will be sent.

3. DoD Extended Security Option

  This option permits additional security labelling information, beyond
  that present in the Basic Security Option, to be supplied in an IP
  datagram to meet the needs of registered authorities.  Note that
  information which is not labelling data or which is meaningful only
  to the end systems (not intermediate systems) is not appropriate for
  transmission in the IP layer and thus should not be transported using
  this option.  This option must be copied on fragmentation.  Unlike
  the Basic Option, this option may appear multiple times within a
  datagram, subject to overall IP header size constraints.
  This option may be present only in conjunction with the Basic
  Security Option, thus all systems which support Extended Security
  Options must also support the Basic Security Option.  However, not
  all systems which support the Basic Security Option need to support
  Extended Security Options and support for these options may be
  selective, i.e., a system need not support all Extended Security
  Options.
  The top-level format for this option is as follows:



Kent [Page 13]

RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


            +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+
            |  10000101  |  000LLLLL  |  AAAAAAAA  |  add sec info  |
            +------------+------------+------------+-------//-------+
             TYPE = 133      LENGTH     ADDITIONAL      ADDITIONAL
                                       SECURITY INFO     SECURITY
                                        FORMAT CODE        INFO
                  FIGURE 3.  DoD EXTENDED SECURITY OPTION FORMAT

3.1. Type

  The value 133 identifies this as the DoD Extended Security Option.

3.2. Length.

  The length of the option, which includes the "Type" and "Length"
  fields, is variable.  The minimum length of the option is 3 octets.

3.3. Additional Security Info Format Code

       Length:  1 Octet
  The value of the Additional Security Info Format Code identifies the
  syntax and semantics for a specific "Additional Security Information"
  field.  For each Additional Security Info Format Code, an RFC will be
  published to specify the syntax and to provide an algorithmic
  description of the processing required to determine whether a
  datagram carrying a label specified by this Format Code should be
  accepted or rejected.  This specification must be sufficiently
  detailed to permit vendors to produce interoperable implementations,
  e.g., it should be comparable to the specification of the Basic
  Security Option provided in this RFC.  However, the specification
  need not include a mapping from the syntax of the option to human
  labels if such mapping would cause distribution of the specification
  to be restricted.
  In order to maintain the architectural consistency of DoD common user
  data networks, and to maximize interoperability, each activity should
  submit its plans for the definition and use of an Additional Security
  Info Format Code to DISA DISDB, Washington, D.C.  20305-2000 for
  review and approval.  DISA DISDB will forward plans to the Internet
  Activities Board for architectural review and, if required, a cleared
  committee formed by the IAB will be constituted for the review
  process.  Once approved, the Internet Assigned Number authority will
  assign an Additional Security Info Format Code to the requesting
  activity, concurrent with publication of the corresponding RFC.
  Note: The bit assignments for the Protection Authority flags of the


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  Basic Security Option have no relationship to the "Additional
  Security Info Format Code" of this option.

3.4. Additional Security Information.

       Length:  Variable
  The Additional Security Info field contains the additional security
  labelling information specified by the "Additional Security Info
  Format Code" of the Extended Security Option.  The syntax and
  processing requirements for this field are specified by the
  associated RFC as noted above.  The minimum length of this field is
  zero.

3.5. System Security Configuration Parameters

  Use of the Extended Security Option requires that the intermediate or
  end system configuration accurately reflect the security parameters
  associated with communication via each network port (see Section 2.5
  as a guide).  Internal representation of the security parameters
  implementation dependent.  The set of parameters required to support
  processing of the Extended Security Option is a function of the set
  of Additional Security Info Format Codes supported by the system.
  The RFC which specifies syntax and processing rules for a registered
  Additional Security Info Format Code will specify the additional
  system security parameters required for processing an Extended
  Security Option relative to that Code.

3.6. Processing Rules

  Any datagram containing an Extended Security Option must also contain
  a Basic Security Option and receipt of a datagram containing the
  former absent the latter constitutes an error.  If the length
  specified by the Length field is inconsistent with the length
  specified by the variable length encoding for the Additional Security
  Info field, the datagram is in error.  If the datagram is received in
  which the Additional Security Info Format Code contains a non-
  registered value, the datagram is in error.  Finally, if the
  Additional Security Info field contains data inconsistent with the
  defining RFC for the Additional Security Info Format Code, the
  datagram is in error.  In any of these cases, an ICMP Parameter
  Problem response should be sent as per Section 2.8.1.  Any additional
  error processing rules will be specified in the defining RFC for this
  Additional Security Info Format Code.
  If the additional security information contained in the Extended
  Security Option indicates that the datagram is within range according
  to the security policy of the system, then the datagram should be


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  accepted for further processing.  Otherwise, the datagram should be
  rejected and the procedure specified in Section 2.8.2 should be
  followed (with the Extended Security Option values set apropos the
  Additional Security Info Format Code port security parameters).
  As with the Basic Security Option, it will not be possible in a
  general internet environment for intermediate systems to provide
  routing control for datagrams based on the labels contained in the
  Extended Security Option until such time as interior and exterior
  gateway routing protocols are enhanced to process such labels.

References

  [DoD 5200.28]  Department of Defense Directive 5200.28, "Security
                 Requirements for Automated Information Systems," 21
                 March 1988.

Security Considerations

  The focus of this RFC is the definition of formats and processing
  conventions to support security labels for data contained in IP
  datagrams, thus a variety of security issues must be considered
  carefully when making use of these options.  It is not possible to
  address all of the security considerations which affect correct
  implementation and use of these options, however the following
  paragraph highglights some of these issues.
  Correct implementation and operation of the software and hardware
  which processes these options is essential to their effective use.
  Means for achieving confidence in such correct implementation and
  operation are outside of the scope of this RFC.  The options
  themselves incorporate no facilities to ensure the integrity of the
  security labels in transit (other than the IP checksum mechanism),
  thus appropriate technology must be employed whenever datagrams
  containing these options transit "hostile" communication
  environments.  Careful, secure management of the configuration
  variables associated with each system making use of these options is
  essential if the options are to provide the intended security
  functionality.







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RFC 1108 U.S. DOD Security Option November 1991


Author's Address

  Stephen Kent
  BBN Communications
  150 CambridgePark Drive
  Cambridge, MA  02140
  Phone: (617) 873-3988
  Email: [email protected]





















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