RFC8774

From RFC-Wiki
Revision as of 21:56, 22 September 2020 by Admin (talk | contribs) (Created page with " Independent Submission M. Welzl Request for Comments: 8774 University of Oslo Category: Informationa...")
(diff) ← Older revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)




Independent Submission M. Welzl Request for Comments: 8774 University of Oslo Category: Informational 1 April 2020 ISSN: 2070-1721


                           The Quantum Bug

Abstract

  The age of quantum networking is upon us, and with it comes
  "entanglement": a procedure in which a state (i.e., a bit) can be
  transferred instantly, with no measurable delay between peers.  This
  will lead to a perceived round-trip time of zero seconds on some
  Internet paths, a capability which was not predicted and so not
  included as a possibility in many protocol specifications.  Worse
  than the millennium bug, this unexpected value is bound to cause
  serious Internet failures unless the specifications are fixed in
  time.

Status of This Memo

  This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
  published for informational purposes.
  This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
  RFC stream.  The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
  its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
  implementation or deployment.  Documents approved for publication by
  the RFC Editor are not candidates for any level of Internet Standard;
  see Section 2 of RFC 7841.
  Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
  and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
  https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8774.

Copyright Notice

  Copyright (c) 2020 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
  document authors.  All rights reserved.
  This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
  Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
  (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
  publication of this document.  Please review these documents
  carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
  to this document.

Table of Contents

  1.  Introduction
  2.  Protocols and Protocol Mechanisms That Will Fail
    2.1.  LEDBAT
    2.2.  Multipath TCP (MPTCP)
    2.3.  RTP Circuit Breakers
  3.  What can be done?
  4.  Conclusion
  5.  IANA Considerations
  6.  Security Considerations
  7.  References
    7.1.  Normative References
    7.2.  Informative References
  Author's Address

1. Introduction

  [RFC6921] discusses faster-than-light communication, where packets
  arrive before they are sent.  While it is amusing to entertain the
  possibility of time travel, we have to accept the cold facts: time
  travel will never work (or it would already have been used).  Quantum
  networking, however, is an entirely different matter -- commercial
  products are already available, and quantum networks will without a
  doubt become the prevalent Internet link-layer technology across the
  globe within the next five to ten years.
  With the help of entanglement, implemented in quantum repeaters,
  quantum networks can transfer information faster than ever before: a
  state can be transmitted over a long distance instantly, with no
  delay.  This is so cool that it is also called (and, by some,
  mistaken for) teleportation.  If a path between a sender and a
  receiver is fully quantum-ized, the measured one-way delay (OWD) will
  be zero.  What's more, assuming that there are blazing fast quantum
  computers involved on both ends, the processing time will be well
  below anything measurable; hence, even the round-trip time (RTT) will
  be zero in these scenarios.
  In today's Internet, only very few protocols are prepared for such
  "0-RTT" situations (e.g., TCP with "TCP Fast Open" (TFO) [RFC7413],
  TLS 1.3 [RFC8446], and QUIC [QUIC-TRANS]).  Many others will fail in
  interesting ways; we coin the term "Quantum Bug" for such failures.
  In the following section, we will discuss some examples of Quantum
  Bugs.

2. Protocols and Protocol Mechanisms That Will Fail

  The number of protocols and protocol mechanisms that will fail in the
  face of a zero RTT is too large to report here; we are truly heading
  towards something close to an Internet meltdown.  We can only provide
  some guidance to those who hunt for the Quantum Bug, by discussing
  examples of specification mistakes that will need to be fixed.

2.1. LEDBAT

  The Low Extra Delay Background Transfer (LEDBAT) congestion control
  mechanism [RFC6817] is a very interesting failure case: designed to
  "get out of the way" of other traffic; it will end up sending as fast
  as possible.  Specifically, when the algorithm described in
  Section 2.4.2 of [RFC6817] obtains a delay sample, it updates a list
  of base delays that will all become 0 and current delays that will
  also all become 0.  It calculates a queuing delay as the difference
  between the current delay and the base delay (resulting in 0) and
  keeps increasing the Congestion Window (cwnd) until the queuing delay
  reaches a predefined parameter value TARGET (100 milliseconds or
  less).
  A TARGET value of 100 milliseconds will never be reached, because the
  queuing delay does not grow when the sender increases its cwnd; this
  means that LEDBAT would endlessly increase its cwnd, limited only by
  the number of bits that are used to represent cwnd.  However, given
  that TARGET=0 is also allowed, this parameter choice may seem to be a
  way out.  Always staying at the target means that the sender would
  maintain its initial cwnd, which should be set to 2.  This may seem
  like a small number, but remember that cwnd is the number of bytes
  that can be transmitted per RTT (which is 0).  Thus, irrespective of
  the TARGET value, the sender will send data as fast as it can.

2.2. Multipath TCP (MPTCP)

  The coupled congestion control mechanism proposed for MPTCP in
  [RFC6356] requires calculating a value called "alpha".  Equation 2 in
  [RFC6356] contains a term where a value called "cwnd_i" is divided by
  the square of the RTT, and another term where this value is divided
  by the RTT.  Enough said.

2.3. RTP Circuit Breakers

  The RTP Circuit Breakers [RFC8083] require calculation of a well-
  known equation which yields the throughput of a TCP connection:
                            s
  X = -------------------------------------------------------------
    Tr*sqrt(2*b*p/3)+(t_RTO * (3*sqrt(3*b*p/8) * p * (1+32*p*p)))
  where Tr is the RTT and t_RTO is the retransmission timeout of TCP
  (we don't need to care about the other variables).  As we will
  discuss in Section 3, t_RTO is lower-bounded with 1 second;
  therefore, it saves us from a division by zero.  However, there is
  also a simplified version of this equation:
            s
  X = ----------------
      Tr*sqrt(2*b*p/3)
  Unfortunately, [RFC8083] states: "It is RECOMMENDED that this
  simplified throughput equation be used since the reduction in
  accuracy is small, and it is much simpler to calculate than the full
  equation."  Due to this simplification, many multimedia applications
  will crash.

3. What can be done?

  Fear not: when everything else fails, TCP will still work.  Its
  retransmission timeout is lower-bounded by 1 second [RFC6298].
  Moreover, while its cwnd may grow up to the maximum storable number,
  data transmission is limited by the Receiver Window (rwnd).  This
  means that flow control will save TCP from failing.
  From this, we can learn two simple rules: lower-bound any values
  calculated from the RTT (and, obviously, do not divide by the RTT),
  and use flow control.  Specifications will need to be updated by
  fixing all RTT-based calculations and introducing flow control
  everywhere.  For example, UDP will have to be extended with a
  receiver window, e.g., as a UDP option [UDP-OPT].

4. Conclusion

  We are in trouble, and there is only one way out: develop a
  comprehensive list of all RFCs containing "0-RTT" mistakes (taking
  [RFC2626] as a guideline), and update all code.  This needs to happen
  fast, the clock is ticking.  Luckily, if we are too slow, we will
  still be able to use TCP to access the specifications.  With DNS over
  TCP [RFC7766], name resolution to find the server containing the
  specifications should also work.

5. IANA Considerations

  This document has no IANA actions.

6. Security Considerations

  Flow control must be used on 0-RTT paths, or else an attacker can
  completely overwhelm a sender with data in a denial-of-service (DoS)
  attack within an instant.  Flow control will need to be added to
  protocols that do not currently have it, such as UDP or ICMP.  IPv6
  will not save us.

7. References

7.1. Normative References

  [RFC2626]  Nesser II, P., "The Internet and the Millennium Problem
             (Year 2000)", RFC 2626, DOI 10.17487/RFC2626, June 1999,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2626>.
  [RFC6921]  Hinden, R., "Design Considerations for Faster-Than-Light
             (FTL) Communication", RFC 6921, DOI 10.17487/RFC6921,
             April 2013, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6921>.

7.2. Informative References

  [QUIC-TRANS]
             Iyengar, J. and M. Thomson, "QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed
             and Secure Transport", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
             draft-ietf-quic-transport-27, 21 February 2020,
             <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-quic-transport-
             27>.
  [RFC6298]  Paxson, V., Allman, M., Chu, J., and M. Sargent,
             "Computing TCP's Retransmission Timer", RFC 6298,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC6298, June 2011,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6298>.
  [RFC6356]  Raiciu, C., Handley, M., and D. Wischik, "Coupled
             Congestion Control for Multipath Transport Protocols",
             RFC 6356, DOI 10.17487/RFC6356, October 2011,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6356>.
  [RFC6817]  Shalunov, S., Hazel, G., Iyengar, J., and M. Kuehlewind,
             "Low Extra Delay Background Transport (LEDBAT)", RFC 6817,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC6817, December 2012,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6817>.
  [RFC7413]  Cheng, Y., Chu, J., Radhakrishnan, S., and A. Jain, "TCP
             Fast Open", RFC 7413, DOI 10.17487/RFC7413, December 2014,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413>.
  [RFC7766]  Dickinson, J., Dickinson, S., Bellis, R., Mankin, A., and
             D. Wessels, "DNS Transport over TCP - Implementation
             Requirements", RFC 7766, DOI 10.17487/RFC7766, March 2016,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7766>.
  [RFC8083]  Perkins, C. and V. Singh, "Multimedia Congestion Control:
             Circuit Breakers for Unicast RTP Sessions", RFC 8083,
             DOI 10.17487/RFC8083, March 2017,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8083>.
  [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
             Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
             <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.
  [UDP-OPT]  Touch, J., "Transport Options for UDP", Work in Progress,
             Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tsvwg-udp-options-08, 12
             September 2019, <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-
             tsvwg-udp-options-08>.

Author's Address

  Michael Welzl
  University of Oslo
  PO Box 1080 Blindern
  N-0316 Oslo
  Norway
  Phone: +47 22 85 24 20
  Email: [email protected]