RFC1439
Network Working Group C. Finseth Request for Comments: 1439 University of Minnesota
March 1993
The Uniqueness of Unique Identifiers
Status of this Memo
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
Abstract
This RFC provides information that may be useful when selecting a method to use for assigning unique identifiers to people.
Contents
The Issue
Computer systems require a way to identify the people associated with them. These identifiers have been called "user names" or "account names." The identifers are typically short, alphanumeric strings. In general, these identifiers must be unique.
The uniqueness is usually achieved in one of three ways:
1) The identifiers are assigned in a unique manner without using information associated with the individual. Example identifiers are:
ax54tv
cs00034
This method was often used by large timesharing systems. While it achieved the uniqueness property, there was no way of guessing the identifier without knowing it through other means.
2) The identifiers are assigned in a unique manner where the bulk of the identifier is algorithmically derived from the individual's name. Example identifers are:
Craig.A.Finseth-1
Finseth1
caf-1
fins0001
3) The identifiers are in general not assigned in a unique manner: the identifier is algorithmically derived from the individual's name
and duplicates are handled in an ad-hoc manner. Example identifiers are:
Craig.Finseth
caf
Now that we have widespread electronic mail, an important feature of an identifier system is the ability to predict the identifier based on other information associated with the individual. This other information is typically the person's name.
Methods two and three make such predictions possible, especially if you have one example mapping from a person's name to the identifier. Method two relies on using some or all of the name and algorithmically varying it to ensure uniqueness (for example, by appending an integer). Method three relies on using some or all of the name and selects an alternate identifier in the case of a duplication.
For both methods, it is important to minimize the need for making the adjustments required to ensure uniqueness (i.e., an integer that is not 1 or an alternate identifier). The probability that an adjustment will be required depends on the format of the identifer and the size of the organization.
Identifier Formats
There are a number of popular identifier formats. This section will list some of them and supply both typical and maximum values for the number of possible identifiers. A "typical" value is the number that you are likely to run into in real life. A "maximum" value is the largest number of possible (without getting extreme about it) values. All ranges are expressed as a number of bits.
Initials
There are three popular formats based on initials: those with one, two, or three letters. (The number of people with more than three initials is assumed to be small.) Values:
format typical maximum
I 4 5
II 8 10
III 12 15
You can also think of these as first, middle, and last initials:
I 4 5
F L 8 10
F M L 12 15
Names
Again, there are three popular formats based on using names: those with the first name, last name, and both first and last names. Values:
format typical maximum
First 8 14
Last 9 13
First Last 17 27
Combinations
I have seen these combinations in use ("F" is first initial, "M" is middle initial, and "L" is last initial):
format typical maximum
F Last 13 18
F M Last 17 23
First L 12 19
First M Last 21 32
Complete List
Here are all possible combinations of nothing, initial, and full name for first, middle, and last. The number of Middle names is assumed to be the same as the number of First names. Values:
format typical maximum
_ _ _ 0 0
_ _ L 4 5
_ _ Last 9 13
_ M _ 4 5
_ M L 5 10
_ M Last 13 18
_ Middle _ 8 14
_ Middle L 12 19
_ Middle Last 17 27
F _ _ 4 5
F _ L 5 10
F _ Last 13 18
F M _ 5 10
F M L 12 15
F M Last 17 23
F Middle _ 12 19
F Middle L 16 24
F Middle Last 21 32
First _ _ 8 14
First _ L 12 19
First _ Last 17 27
First M _ 12 19
First M L 16 24
First M Last 21 32
First Middle _ 16 28
First Middle L 20 33
First Middle Last 26 40
Probabilities of Duplicates
As can be seen, the information content in these identifiers in no case exceeds 40 bits and the typical information content never exceeds 26 bits. The content of most of them is in the 8 to 20 bit range. Duplicates are thus not only possible but likely.
The method used to compute the probability of duplicates is the same as that of the well-known "birthday" problem. For a universe of N items, the probability of duplicates in X members is expressed by:
N N-1 N-2 N-(X-1)
- x --- x --- x ... x -------
N N N N
A program to compute this function for selected values of N is given in the appendix, as is its complete output.
The "1%" column is the number of items (people) before an organization of that (universe) size has a 1% chance of a duplicate. Similarly for 2%, 5%, 10%, and 20%.
bits universe 1% 2% 5% 10% 20%
6 64 2 3 4 5 6
7 128 3 3 5 6 8
8 256 3 4 6 8 12
9 512 4 6 8 11 16
10 1,024 6 7 11 16 22
11 2,048 7 10 15 22 31
12 4,096 10 14 21 30 44
13 8,192 14 19 30 43 61
14 16,384 19 27 42 60 86
15 32,768 27 37 59 84 122
16 65,536 37 52 83 118 172
17 131,072 52 74 117 167 243
18 262,144 74 104 165 236 343
19 524,288 104 147 233 333 485
20 1,048,576 146 207 329 471 685
21 2,097,152 206 292 465 666 968
22 4,194,304 291 413 657 941 1369
23 8,388,608 412 583 929 1330 1936
24 16,777,216 582 824 1313 1881 2737
25 33,554,432 822 1165 1856 2660 3871
26 67,108,864 1162 1648 2625 3761 5474
27 134,217,728 1644 2330 3712 5319 7740
28 268,435,456 2324 3294 5249 7522 10946
29 536,870,912 3286 4659 7422 10637 15480
30 1,073,741,824 4647 6588 10496 15043 21891
31 2,147,483,648 6571 9316 14844 21273 30959
For example, assume an organization were to select the "First Last" form. This form has 17 bits (typical) and 27 bits (maximum) of information. The relevant line is:
17 131,072 52 74 117 167 243
For an organization with 100 people, the probability of a duplicate would be between 2% and 5% (probably around 4%). If the organization had 1,000 people, the probability of a duplicate would be much greater than 20%.
Appendix: Reuse of Identifiers and Privacy Issues
Let's say that an organization were to select the format:
First.M.Last-#
as my own organization has. Is the -# required, or can one simply do:
Craig.A.Finseth
for the first one and
Craig.A.Finseth-2
(or -1) for the second? The answer is "no," although for non-obvious reasons.
Assume that the organization has made this selection and a third party wants to send e-mail to Craig.A.Finseth. Because of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1987, an organization must treat electronic mail with care. In this case, there is no way for the third party user to reliably know that sending to Craig.A.Finseth is (may be) the wrong party. On the other hand, if the -# suffix is always present and attempts to send mail to the non-suffix form are rejected, the third party user will realize that they must have the suffix in order to have a unique identifier.
For similar reasons, identifiers in this form should not be re-used in the life of the mail system.
Appendix: Perl Program to Compute Probabilities
- !/usr/local/bin/perl
for $bits (6..31) {
&Compute($bits);
}
exit(0);
- ------------------------------------------------------------
sub Compute {
$bits = $_[0];
$num = 1 << $bits;
$cnt = $num;
print "bits $bitsnumber $num:0;
for ($prob = 1; $prob > 0.99; ) {
$prob *= $cnt / $num;
$cnt--;
}
print "", $num - $cnt, "$prob0;
for (; $prob > 0.98; ) {
$prob *= $cnt / $num;
$cnt--;
}
print "", $num - $cnt, "$prob0;
for (; $prob > 0.95; ) {
$prob *= $cnt / $num;
$cnt--;
}
print "", $num - $cnt, "$prob0;
for (; $prob > 0.90; ) {
$prob *= $cnt / $num;
$cnt--;
}
print "", $num - $cnt, "$prob0;
for (; $prob > 0.80; ) {
$prob *= $cnt / $num;
$cnt--;
}
print "", $num - $cnt, "$prob0;
print "0;
}
Appendix: Perl Program Output
bits 6 number 64:
2 0.984375
3 0.95361328125
4 0.90891265869140625
5 0.85210561752319335938
6 0.78553486615419387817
bits 7 number 128:
3 0.9766845703125
3 0.9766845703125
5 0.92398747801780700684
6 0.88789421715773642063
8 0.79999355674331695809
bits 8 number 256:
3 0.988311767578125
4 0.97672998905181884766
6 0.94268989971169503406
8 0.89542306910786462204
12 0.76969425214152431547
bits 9 number 512:
4 0.98832316696643829346
6 0.97102570187075798458
8 0.94652632751096643648
11 0.89748056780293572476
16 0.78916761796439427457
bits 10 number 1024:
6 0.98543241551841020964
7 0.97965839745873206645
11 0.94753115178840541244
16 0.88888866335604777014
22 0.79677613655632184564
bits 11 number 2048:
7 0.98978773152834598203
10 0.97823367137821537476
15 0.94990722378677450166
22 0.89298119682681720288
31 0.79597589885472519455
bits 12 number 4096:
10 0.98906539062491305447
14 0.97800426773009718762
21 0.94994111694430838355
30 0.89901365764115603874
44 0.79312138620093930452
bits 13 number 8192:
14 0.98894703242829806733
19 0.97932692503837115439
30 0.94822407309193512681
43 0.89545741661906652631
61 0.7993625840767998314
bits 14 number 16384:
19 0.98961337517641645434
27 0.97879319536756481668
42 0.94876352395820107155
60 0.89748107890372830209
86 0.79973683158771624591
bits 15 number 32768:
27 0.98934263776790121181
37 0.97987304880641035165
59 0.94909471808051404373
84 0.89899774209805793923
122 0.79809378598190949816
bits 16 number 65536:
37 0.98988724065590050216
52 0.97996496661944154649
83 0.94937874420413270737
118 0.89996948010355670711
172 0.79884228150816105618
bits 17 number 131072:
52 0.98993311138884398925
74 0.97960010416289267088
117 0.94952974978505377823
167 0.89960828942716541956
243 0.79894309171178368167
bits 18 number 262144:
74 0.98974844864797828503
104 0.97977315557223210174
165 0.94968621078621640041
236 0.8995926348279144058
343 0.7994422793765953994
bits 19 number 524288:
104 0.98983557888923057178
147 0.97973841652874515962
233 0.94974719445364064185
333 0.89991342619657743729
485 0.79936749144148444568
bits 20 number 1048576:
146 0.98995567500195758015
207 0.97987072919607220989
329 0.94983990872655321702
471 0.89980857451706741656
685 0.79974215234216872172
bits 21 number 2097152:
206 0.98998177463778547214
292 0.97994400939715686771
465 0.94985589918092261374
666 0.89978055267663470396
968 0.79994886751736571373
bits 22 number 4194304:
291 0.98999013137747737812
413 0.97991951242142538714
657 0.94991674892578203959
941 0.89991652739633254399
1369 0.79989205747440361716
bits 23 number 8388608:
412 0.98995762604049764022
583 0.97997846530691334888
929 0.94991024716640248826
1330 0.89999961063320443877
1936 0.79987028265451087794
bits 24 number 16777216:
582 0.98997307486745211857
824 0.97999203469417239809
1313 0.94995516684099989835
1881 0.89997049960675035152
2737 0.79996700222056416063
bits 25 number 33554432:
822 0.98999408609360783906
1165 0.9799956928177964155
1856 0.9499899669674316538
2660 0.8999664414095410736
3871 0.79992328289672998132
bits 26 number 67108864:
1162 0.98999884535478044345
1648 0.9799801637652703068
2625 0.94997437525354821997
3761 0.89999748465616635773
5474 0.79993922903192515861
bits 27 number 134217728:
1644 0.9899880636014986024
2330 0.97998730103356856969
3712 0.94997727934463771504
5319 0.89998552434244594167
7740 0.79999591580103557309
bits 28 number 268435456:
2324 0.98999458855588851058
3294 0.97999828329325222587
5249 0.94998397932368705554
7522 0.89998576049206902017
10946 0.79999058777500076101
bits 29 number 536870912:
3286 0.98999717306002099626
4659 0.97999160965267329004
7422 0.94999720388831232487
10637 0.89999506567702891591
15480 0.7999860979665908145
bits 30 number 1073741824:
4647 0.98999674474047760775
6588 0.97999531736215383937
10496 0.94999806770951356061
15043 0.89999250738244507275
21891 0.79999995570982085358
bits 31 number 2147483648:
6571 0.98999869761078929109
9316 0.97999801528523688976
14844 0.94999403283519279206
21273 0.89999983631135749285
30959 0.79999272222201334159
References
Bruce Lansky (1984). The Best Baby Name Book. Deephaven, MN: Meadowbrook. ISBN 0-671-54463-2.
Lareina Rule (1988). Name Your Baby. Bantam. ISBN 0-553-27145-8.
Security Considerations
Security issues are not discussed in this memo.
Author's Address
Craig A. Finseth Networking Services Computer and Information Services University of Minnesota 130 Lind Hall 207 Church St. SE Minneapolis, MN 55455-0134
EMail: [email protected] or
[email protected]
Phone: +1 612 624 3375 Fax: +1 612 626 1002
