RFC6403
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Zieglar Request for Comments: 6403 NSA Category: Informational S. Turner ISSN: 2070-1721 IECA
M. Peck
November 2011
Suite B Profile of Certificate Management over CMS
Abstract
The United States government has published guidelines for "NSA Suite B Cryptography", which defines cryptographic algorithm policy for national security applications. This document specifies a profile of the Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) protocol for managing Suite B X.509 public key certificates. This profile is a refinement of RFCs 5272, 5273, and 5274.
Status of This Memo
This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6403.
Copyright Notice
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved.
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.
Contents
Introduction
This document specifies a profile for using the Certificate Management over CMS (CMC) protocol, defined in RFC5272, RFC5273, and RFC5274, and updated by RFC6402, to manage X.509 public key certificates compliant with the United States National Security Agency's Suite B Cryptography as defined in the Suite B Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile RFC5759. This document specifically focuses on defining CMC interactions for both initial enrollment and rekey of Suite B public key certificates between a client and a Certification Authority (CA). One or more Registration Authorities (RAs) may act as intermediaries between the client and the CA. This profile may be further tailored by specific communities to meet their needs. Specific communities will also define Certificate Policies that implementations need to comply with.
Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.
The terminology in RFC5272 Section 2.1 applies to this profile.
Requirements and Assumptions
All key pairs are on either the curve P-256 or the curve P-384. FIPS 186-3 [DSS], Appendix B.4, provides useful guidance for elliptic curve key pair generation that SHOULD be followed by systems that conform to this document.
This document assumes that the required trust anchors have been securely provisioned to the client and, when applicable, to any RAs.
All requirements in RFC5272, RFC5273, RFC5274, and RFC6402 apply, except where overridden by this profile.
This profile was developed with the scenarios described in Appendix A in mind. However, use of this profile is not limited to just those scenarios.
The term "client" in this profile typically refers to an end-entity. However, it may instead refer to a third party acting on the end- entity's behalf. The client may or may not be the entity that
actually generates the key pair, but it does perform the CMC protocol interactions with the RA and/or CA. For example, the client may be a token management system that communicates with a cryptographic token through an out-of-band secure protocol.
This profile uses the term "rekey" in the same manner as does CMC (defined in Section 2 of RFC5272). The profile makes no specific statements about the ability to do "renewal" operations; however, the statements applicable to rekey should be applied to renewal as well.
This profile may be used to manage RA and/or CA certificates. In that case, the RA and/or CA whose certificate is being managed is considered to be the end-entity.
This profile does not support key establishment certification requests from cryptographic modules that cannot generate a one-time signature with a key establishment key for proof-of-possession purposes. In that case, a separate profile would be needed to define the use of another proof-of-possession technique.
Client Requirements: Generating PKI Requests
This section specifies the conventions employed when a client requests a certificate from a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The Full PKI Request MUST be used; it MUST be encapsulated in a SignedData; and the SignedData MUST be constructed as defined in RFC6318. The PKIData content type complies with RFC5272 with the following additional requirements:
o controlSequence SHOULD be present, and it SHOULD include the
following CMC controls: Transaction ID and Sender Nonce. Other CMC controls MAY be included. If the request is being authenticated using a shared-secret, then the following requirements in this paragraph apply: Identity Proof Version 2 control, as defined in RFC5272, MUST be included; hashAlgId MUST be id-sha256 or id-sha384 for P-256 certification requests, and MUST be id-sha384 for P-384 certification requests (both algorithm OIDs are defined in RFC5754); macAlgId MUST be HMAC-SHA256 when the hashAlgId is id-sha256, and MUST be HMAC-SHA384 when the hashAlgId is id-sha384 (both HMAC algorithms are defined in RFC4231). If the subject included in the certification request is NULL or otherwise does not uniquely identify the end-entity, then the POP Link Random control MUST be included, and the POP Link Witness Version 2 control MUST be included in the inner PKCS #10 or Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) request as described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
o reqSequence MUST be present. It MUST include at least one tcr
(see Section 4.1) or crm (see Section 4.2) TaggedRequest. Support for the orm choice is OPTIONAL.
If the Full PKI Request contains a P-256 public key certification request, then the SignedData encapsulating the Full PKI Request MUST be generated using either SHA-256 and ECDSA on P-256 or using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the Full PKI Request contains a P-384 public key certification request, then the SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384.
A Full PKI Request MUST be signed using the private key that corresponds to the public key of an existing signature certificate unless an appropriate signature certificate does not yet exist, such as during initial enrollment.
If an appropriate signature certificate does not yet exist, and if a Full PKI Request includes one or more certification requests and is authenticated using a shared-secret (because no appropriate certificate exists yet to authenticate the request), the Full PKI Request MUST be signed using the private key corresponding to the public key of one of the requested certificates. When necessary (i.e., because there is no existing signature certificate and there is no signature certification request included), a Full PKI Request MAY be signed using a key pair intended for use in a key establishment certificate. However, servers are not required to allow this behavior.
Tagged Certification Request
The reqSequence tcr choice conveys PKCS #10 RFC2986 syntax. The CertificateRequest MUST comply with RFC5272, Section 3.2.1.2.1, with the following additional requirements:
o certificationRequestInfo:
* subjectPublicKeyInfo MUST be set as defined in Section 4.4 of
RFC5759;
* attributes:
- The ExtensionReq attribute MUST be included with its
contents as follows:
o The Key Usage extension MUST be included, and it MUST be
set as defined in RFC5759.
o For rekey requests, the SubjectAltName extension MUST be
included and set equal to the SubjectAltName of the
certificate that is being used to sign the SignedData
encapsulating the request (i.e., not the certificate
being rekeyed) if the Subject field of the certificate
being used to generate the signature is NULL.
o Other extension requests MAY be included as desired.
- The ChangeSubjectName attribute, as defined in RFC6402, MUST be included if the Full PKI Request encapsulating this Tagged Certification Request is being signed by a key for which a certificate currently exists and the existing certificate's Subject or SubjectAltName does not match the desired Subject or SubjectAltName of this certification request.
- The POP Link Witness Version 2 attribute MUST be included if
the request is being authenticated using a shared-secret and
the Subject in the certification request is NULL or
otherwise does not uniquely identify the end-entity. In the
POP Link Witness Version 2 attribute, keyGenAlgorithm MUST
be id-sha256 or id-sha384 for P-256 certification requests
and MUST be id-sha384 for P-384 certification requests, as
defined in RFC5754; macAlgorithm MUST be HMAC-SHA256 when
the keyGenAlgorithm is id-sha256 and MUST be HMAC-SHA384
when the keyGenAlgorithm is id-sha384, as defined in
RFC4231.
* signatureAlgorithm MUST be ecdsa-with-sha256 for P-256
certification requests and MUST be ecdsa-with-sha384 for P-384
certification requests;
* signature MUST be generated using the private key corresponding
to the public key in the CertificationRequestInfo, for both
signature and key establishment certification requests. The
signature provides proof-of-possession of the private key to
the Certification Authority.
Certificate Request Message
The reqSequence crm choice conveys Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF) RFC4211 syntax. The CertReqMsg MUST comply with RFC5272, Section 3.2.1.2.2, with the following additional requirements:
o popo MUST be included using the signature (POPOSigningKey) proof-
of-possession choice and set as defined in RFC4211, Section 4.1, for both signature and key establishment certification requests.
The POPOSigningKey poposkInput field MUST be omitted. The POPOSigningKey algorithmIdentifier MUST be ecdsa-with-sha256 for P-256 certification requests and MUST be ecdsa-with-sha384 for P-384 certification requests. The signature MUST be generated using the private key corresponding to the public key in the CertTemplate.
The CertTemplate MUST comply with RFC5272, Section 3.2.1.2.2, with the following additional requirements:
o version MAY be included and, if included, it MUST be set to 2 as
defined in Section 4.3 of RFC5759;
o publicKey MUST be set as defined in Section 4.4 of RFC5759;
o extensions:
* The Key Usage extension MUST be included, and it MUST be set as
defined in RFC5759.
* For rekey requests, the SubjectAltName extension MUST be
included and set equal to the SubjectAltName of the certificate
that is being used to sign the SignedData encapsulating the
request (i.e., not the certificate being rekeyed) if the
Subject field of the certificate being used to generate the
signature is NULL.
* Other extension requests MAY be included as desired.
o controls:
* The ChangeSubjectName attribute, as defined in RFC6402, MUST be included if the Full PKI Request encapsulating this Tagged Certification Request is being signed by a key for which a certificate currently exists and the existing certificate's Subject or SubjectAltName does not match the desired Subject or SubjectAltName of this certification request.
* The POP Link Witness Version 2 attribute MUST be included if
the request is being authenticated using a shared-secret, and
the Subject in the certification request is NULL or otherwise
does not uniquely identify the end-entity. In the POP Link
Witness Version 2 attribute, keyGenAlgorithm MUST be id-sha256
or id-sha384 for P-256 certification requests and MUST be
id-sha384 for P-384 certification requests; macAlgorithm MUST
be HMAC-SHA256 when keyGenAlgorithm is id-sha256 and MUST be
HMAC-SHA384 when keyGenAlgorithm is id-sha384.
RA Requirements
This section addresses the optional case where one or more RAs act as intermediaries between the client and CA as described in Section 7 of RFC5272. In this section, the term "client" refers to the entity from which the RA received the PKI Request. This section is only applicable to RAs.
RA Processing of Requests
RAs conforming to this document MUST ensure that only the permitted signature, hash, and MAC algorithms described throughout this profile are used in requests; if they are not, the RA MUST reject those requests. The RA SHOULD return a CMCFailInfo with the value of badAlg RFC5272.
When processing end-entity-generated SignedData objects, RAs MUST NOT perform Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints (CCC) certificate extension processing RFC6010.
Other RA processing is as in RFC5272.
RA-Generated PKI Requests
If the RA encapsulates the client-generated PKI Request in a new RA- signed PKI Request, it MUST create a Full PKI Request encapsulated in a SignedData, and the SignedData MUST be constructed as defined in RFC6318. The PKIData content type complies with RFC5272 with the following additional requirements:
o controlSequence MUST be present. It MUST include the following
CMC controls: Transaction ID, Sender Nonce, and Batch Requests. Other appropriate CMC controls MAY be included.
o cmsSequence MUST be present. It contains the original, unmodified
request(s) received from the client.
RA certificates are authorized to sign Full PKI Requests with an Extended Key Usage (EKU) and/or with the CCC certificate extension RFC6010. Certificates may also be authorized through local configuration. Authorized certificates SHOULD include the id-kp-cmcRA EKU from RFC6402. Authorized certificates MAY also include the CCC certificate extension RFC6010, or the authorized certificate MAY just include the CCC certificate extension. If the RA is authorized via the CCC extension, then the CCC extension MUST include the object identifier for the PKIData content type. CCC SHOULD be included if constraints are to be placed on the content types generated.
If the RA-signed PKI Request contains a certification request for a P-256 public key, then the SignedData MUST be generated using either SHA-256 and ECDSA on P-256 or SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the request contains a certification request for a P-384 public key, then the SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the RA-signed PKI Request contains requests for certificates on the P-256 and P-384 curve, then the SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the Full PKI Response is a successful response to a PKI Request that only contained a Get Certificate or Get CRL control, then the SignedData MUST be signed by either SHA-256 and ECDSA on P-256 or SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384, the algorithm used in the response MUST match the algorithm used in the request.
RA-Generated Errors
RA certificates authorized with the CCC certificate extension RFC6010 MUST include the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type to authorize them to generate responses.
CA Requirements
This section specifies the requirements for CAs that receive PKI Requests and that generate PKI Responses.
CA Processing of PKI Requests
CAs conforming to this document MUST ensure that only the permitted signature, hash, and MAC algorithms described throughout this profile are used in requests; if they are not, the CA MUST reject those requests. The CA SHOULD return a CMCStatusInfoV2 control with CMCStatus of failed and a CMCFailInfo with the value of badAlg RFC5272.
For requests involving an RA, the CA MUST verify the RA's authorization. The following certificate fields MUST NOT be modifiable using the Modify Certification Request control: publicKey and the key usage extension. The request MUST be rejected if an attempt to modify those certification request fields is present. The CA SHOULD return a CMCStatusInfoV2 control with CMCStatus of failed and a CMCFailInfo with a value of badRequest.
When processing end-entity-generated SignedData objects, CAs MUST NOT perform CCC certificate extension processing RFC6010.
If the client-generated PKI Request includes a ChangeSubjectName attribute either in the CertRequest controls field for a CRMF request or in the tcr attributes field for a PKCS#10 request, then the CA
MUST ensure that name change is authorized. The mechanism for ensuring that the name change is authorized is out of scope. If the CA performs this check, and the name change is not authorized, then the CA MUST reject the PKI Request. The CA SHOULD return a CMCStatusInfoV2 control with CMCStatus of failed.
Other processing of PKIRequests is as in RFC5272.
CA-Generated PKI Responses
If a Full PKI Response is returned, it MUST be encapsulated in a SignedData, and the SignedData MUST be constructed as defined in RFC6318.
If the PKI Response is in response to an RA-encapsulated PKI Request, then the above PKI Response is encapsulated in another CA-generated PKI Response. That PKI Response MUST be encapsulated in a SignedData and the SignedData MUST be constructed as defined in RFC6318. The above PKI Response is placed in the encapsulating PKI Response cmsSequence field. The other fields are as above with the addition of the batch response control in controlSequence. The following illustrates a successful CA response to an RA-encapsulated PKI Request, both of which include Transaction IDs and Nonces:
SignedData (applied by the CA)
PKIData
controlSequence (Transaction ID, Sender Nonce, Recipient
Nonce, Batch Response)
cmsSequence
SignedData (applied by CA and includes returned
certificates)
PKIData
controlSequence (Transaction ID, Sender Nonce,
Recipient Nonce)
The same private key used to sign certificates MUST NOT be used to sign Full PKI Response messages. Instead, a separate certificate authorized to sign CMC responses MUST be used. Certificates are authorized to sign Full PKI Responses with an EKU and/or with the CCC certificate extension RFC6010. Certificates may also be authorized through local configuration. Authorized certificates SHOULD include the id-kp-cmcCA EKU from RFC6402. Authorized certificates MAY also include the CCC certificate extension RFC6010, or the authorized certificate MAY just include the CCC certificate extension. If the CA is authorized via the CCC extension, then the CCC extension MUST include the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type. CCC SHOULD be included if constraints are to be placed on the content types generated.
The signature on the SignedData MUST be generated using either ECDSA P-256 on SHA-256 or ECDSA P-384 on SHA-384. If the Full PKI Response is a successful response to a P-256 public key certification request, then the SignedData MUST be generated using either SHA-256 and ECDSA on P-256 or SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the Full PKI Response is a successful response to a P-384 public key certification request, then the SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the Full PKI Response is a successful response to certification requests on both the P-256 and P-356 curves, then the SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the Full PKI Response is an unsuccessful response to a PKI Request, then the SignedData MUST be signed by either SHA-256 and ECDSA on P-256 or SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384, the algorithm used in the response MUST match the algorithm used in the request. If the Full PKI Response is an unsuccessful response to certification requests on both the P-256 and P-356 curves, then the SignedData MUST be generated using SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384. If the Full PKI Response is a successful response to a PKI Request that only contained a Get Certificate or Get CRL control, then the SignedData MUST be signed by either SHA-256 and ECDSA on P-256 or SHA-384 and ECDSA on P-384, the algorithm used in the response MUST match the algorithm used in the request.
If the PKI Response is in response to an RA-encapsulated PKI Request, the signature algorithm for each SignedData is selected independently.
Client Requirements: Processing PKI Responses
Clients conforming to this document MUST ensure that only the permitted signature, hash, and MAC algorithms described throughout this profile are used in responses; if they are not, the client MUST reject those responses.
Clients MUST authenticate all Full PKI Responses. This includes verifying that the PKI Response is signed by an authorized CA or RA whose certificate validates back to a trust anchor. The authorized CA certificate MUST include the id-kp-cmcCA EKU and/or include a CCC extension that includes the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type. Or, the CA is determined to be authorized to sign responses through an implementation-specific mechanism. The PKI Response can be signed by an RA if it is an error message, if it is a response to a Get Certificate or Get CRL request, or if the PKI Response contains an inner PKI Response signed by a CA. In the last case, each layer of PKI Response MUST still contain an authorized, valid signature signed by an entity with a valid certificate that verifies back to an acceptable trust anchor. The authorized RA certificate MUST include the id-kp-cmcRA EKU and/or include a CCC
extension that includes the object identifier for the PKIResponse content type. Or, the RA is determined to be authorized to sign responses through an implementation-specific mechanism.
When a newly issued certificate is included in the PKI Response, the client MUST verify that the newly issued certificate's public key matches the public key that the client requested. The client MUST also ensure that the certificate's signature is valid and that the signature validates back to an acceptable trust anchor.
Clients MUST reject PKI Responses that do not pass these tests. Local policy will determine whether the client returns a Full PKI Response with an Extended CMC Status Info control with CMCStatus set to failed to a user console, error log, or the server.
If the Full PKI Response contains an Extended Status Info with a CMCStatus set to failed, then local policy will determine whether the client resends a duplicate certification request back to the server or an error state is returned to a console or error log.
When the Identity Proof V2 and POP Link Witness V2 controls are used, the shared-secret MUST be randomly generated and securely distributed. The shared-secret MUST provide at least 128 bits of strength for P-256 certification requests and at least 192 bits of strength for P-384 certification requests.
Security Considerations
Protocol security considerations are found in RFC2986, RFC4211, RFC6318, RFC5272, RFC5273, RFC5274, RFC5759, and RFC6402. When CCC is used to authorize RA and CA certificates, then the security considerations in RFC6010 also apply. Algorithm security considerations are found in RFC6318.
Compliant with NIST Special Publication 800-57 [SP80057], this profile defines proof-of-possession of a key establishment private key by performing a digital signature. Except for one-time proof-of- possession, a single key pair MUST NOT be used for both signature and key establishment.
This specification requires implementations to generate key pairs and other random values. The use of inadequate pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) can result in little or no security. The generation of quality random numbers is difficult. NIST Special Publication 800-90 [SP80090], FIPS 186-3 [DSS], and RFC4086 offer random number generation guidance.
When RAs are used, the list of authorized RAs must be securely distributed out-of-band to CAs.
Presence of the POP Link Witness Version 2 and POP Link Random attributes protects against substitution attacks.
The Certificate Policy for a particular environment will specify whether expired certificates can be used to sign certification requests.
10. Acknowledgments
Michael Peck wishes to acknowledge that he was employed at the National Security Agency during much of the work on this document.
11. References
11.1. Normative References
[DSS] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
FIPS 186-3: Digital Signature Standard (DSS), June 2009.
RFC2119 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
RFC2986 Nystrom, M. and B. Kaliski, "PKCS #10: Certification
Request Syntax Specification Version 1.7", RFC 2986, November 2000.
RFC4086 Eastlake 3rd, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker,
"Randomness Requirements for Security", BCP 106, RFC 4086, June 2005.
RFC4211 Schaad, J., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Certificate Request Message Format (CRMF)", RFC 4211, September 2005.
RFC4231 Nystrom, M., "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-
SHA-224, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512",
RFC 4231, December 2005.
RFC5272 Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC)", RFC 5272, June 2008.
RFC5273 Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management over CMS
(CMC): Transport Protocols", RFC 5273, June 2008.
RFC5274 Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management Messages
over CMS (CMC): Compliance Requirements", RFC 5274, June 2008.
RFC5754 Turner, S., "Using SHA2 Algorithms with Cryptographic
Message Syntax", RFC 5754, January 2010.
RFC5759 Solinas, J. and L. Zieglar, "Suite B Certificate and
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 5759, January 2010.
RFC6010 Housley, R., Ashmore, S., and C. Wallace, "Cryptographic
Message Syntax (CMS) Content Constraints Extension", RFC
6010, September 2010.
RFC6318 Housley, R. and J. Solinas, "Suite B in
Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)",
RFC 6318, June 2011.
RFC6402 Schaad, J., "Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)
Updates", RFC 6402, November 2011.
11.2. Informative References
[SP80057] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Special Publication 800-57 Part 1: Recommendation for Key
Management, March 2007.
[SP80090] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Special Publication 800-90: Recommendation for Random
Number Generation Using Deterministic Random Number Bits
Generators (Revised), March 2007.
Appendix A. Scenarios
This section illustrates several potential certificate enrollment and rekey scenarios supported by this profile. This section does not intend to place any limits or restrictions on the use of CMC.
A.1. Initial Enrollment
This section describes three scenarios for authenticating initial enrollment requests:
1. Previously installed signature certificate (e.g., Manufacturer
Installed Certificate);
2. Shared-secret distributed securely out-of-band;
3. RA authentication.
A.1.1. Previously Installed Signature Certificate
In this scenario, the end-entity has had a signature certificate installed by the cryptographic module manufacturer. As the end- entity already has a signature certificate, it can be used to authenticate a request for a new certificate. The end-entity signs the Full PKI Request with the private key that corresponds to the subject public key of a previously installed signature certificate. The CA will recognize the authorization of the previously installed certificate and issue an appropriate certificate to the end-entity.
A.1.2. Shared-Secret Distributed Securely Out-of-Band
In this scenario, the CA distributes a shared-secret out-of-band to the end-entity that the end-entity uses to authenticate its certification request. The end-entity signs the Full PKI Request with the private key for which the certification is being requested. The end-entity includes the Identity Proof Version 2 control to authenticate the request using the shared-secret. The CA uses either the Identification control or the Subject in the end-entity's enclosed PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request message to identify the request. The end-entity performs either the POP Link Witness Version 2 mechanism as described in RFC5272, Section 6.3.1.1, or the Shared-Subject/Subject Distinguished Name (DN) linking mechanism as described in RFC5272, Section 6.3.2. The Subject in the enclosed PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request does not necessarily match the issued certificate, as it may be used just to help identify the request (and corresponding shared-secret) to the CA.
A.1.3. RA Authentication
In this scenario, the end-entity does not automatically authenticate its enrollment request to the CA, either because the end-entity has nothing to authenticate the request with or because organizational policy requires RA involvement. The end-entity creates a Full PKI Request and sends it to an RA. The RA verifies the authenticity of the request, then, if approved, encapsulates and signs the request as described in Section 5.2, forwarding the new request on to the CA. The Subject in the PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request is not required to match the issued certificate, it may be used just to help identify the request to the RA and/or CA.
A.2. Rekey
There are two scenarios to support the rekey of certificates that are already enrolled. One addresses the rekey of signature certificates and the other addresses the rekey of key establishment certificates. Typically, organizational policy will require certificates to be currently valid to be rekeyed, and it may require initial enrollment to be repeated when rekey is not possible. However, some organizational policies might allow a grace period during which an expired certificate could be used to rekey.
A.2.1. Rekey of Signature Certificates
When a signature certificate is rekeyed, the PKCS #10 or CRMF certification request message enclosed in the Full PKI Request will include the same Subject as the current signature certificate. The Full PKI Request will be signed by the current private key corresponding to the current signature certificate.
A.2.2. Rekey of Key Establishment Certificates
When a key establishment certificate is rekeyed, the Full PKI Request will generally be signed by the current private key corresponding to the current signature certificate. If there is no current signature certificate, one of the initial enrollment options in Appendix A.1 may be used.
Authors' Addresses
Lydia Zieglar National Information Assurance Research Laboratory National Security Agency
EMail: [email protected]
Sean Turner IECA, Inc. 3057 Nutley Street, Suite 106 Fairfax, VA 22031 USA
EMail: [email protected]
Michael Peck
EMail: [email protected]
