RFC6712
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Kause Request for Comments: 6712 SSH Updates: 4210 M. Peylo Category: Standards Track NSN ISSN: 2070-1721 September 2012
Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure -- HTTP Transfer
for the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
Abstract
This document describes how to layer the Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) over HTTP. It is the "CMPtrans" document referenced in RFC 4210; therefore, this document updates the reference given therein.
Status of This Memo
This is an Internet Standards Track document.
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has received public review and has been approved for publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of RFC 5741.
Information about the current status of this document, any errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6712.
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Contents
Introduction
The Certificate Management Protocol (CMP) RFC4210 requires a well- defined transfer mechanism to enable End Entities (EEs), Registration Authorities (RAs), and Certification Authorities (CAs) to pass PKIMessage sequences between them.
The first version of the CMP specification RFC2510 included a brief description of a simple transfer protocol layer on top of TCP. Its features were simple transfer-level error handling and a mechanism to poll for outstanding PKI messages. Additionally, it was mentioned that PKI messages could also be conveyed using file-, E-mail-, and HTTP-based transfer, but those were not specified in detail.
The current version of the CMP specification RFC4210 incorporated its own polling mechanism, and thus the need for a transfer protocol providing this functionality vanished. The remaining features CMP requires from its transfer protocols are connection and error handling.
Before this document was published as an RFC, the draft version underwent drastic changes during the long-lasting work process. The so-called "Direct TCP-Based Management Protocol" specified in RFC2510 was enhanced, and at some point a version existed where this protocol was again transferred over HTTP. As both approaches proved to be needless and cumbersome, implementers preferred to use plain HTTP transfer following RFC1945 or RFC2616. This document now reflects that by exclusively describing HTTP as the transfer protocol for CMP.
The usage of HTTP for transferring CMP messages exclusively uses the POST method for requests, effectively tunneling CMP over HTTP. While this is generally considered bad practice and should not be emulated, there are good reasons to do so for transferring CMP. HTTP is used as it is generally easy to implement and it is able to traverse network borders utilizing ubiquitous proxies. Most importantly, HTTP is already commonly used in existing CMP implementations. Other HTTP request methods, such as GET, are not used because PKI management operations can only be triggered using CMP's PKI messages, which need to be transferred using a POST request.
With its status codes, HTTP provides needed error reporting capabilities. General problems on the server side, as well as those directly caused by the respective request, can be reported to the client.
As CMP implements a transaction ID, identifying transactions spanning over more than just a single request/response pair, the statelessness of HTTP is not blocking its usage as the transfer protocol for CMP messages.
Conventions Used in This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in RFC2119.
HTTP-Based Protocol
For direct interaction between two entities, where a reliable transport protocol like TCP is available, HTTP SHOULD be utilized for conveying CMP messages.
HTTP Versions
Implementations MUST support HTTP/1.0 RFC1945 and SHOULD support HTTP/1.1 RFC2616.
Persistent Connections
HTTP persistent connections RFC2616 allow multiple interactions to take place on the same HTTP connection. However, neither HTTP nor the protocol specified in this document are designed to correlate messages on the same connection in any meaningful way; persistent connections are only a performance optimization. In particular, intermediaries can do things like mix connections from different clients into one "upstream" connection, terminate persistent connections, and forward requests as non-persistent requests, etc. As such, implementations MUST NOT infer that requests on the same connection come from the same client (e.g., for correlating PKI messages with ongoing transactions); every message is to be evaluated in isolation.
General Form
A DER-encoded [ITU.X690.1994] PKIMessage RFC4210 is sent as the entity-body of an HTTP POST request. If this HTTP request is successful, the server returns the CMP response in the body of the HTTP response. The HTTP response status code in this case MUST be 200; other "Successful 2xx" codes MUST NOT be used for this purpose. HTTP responses to pushed CMP Announcement messages (i.e., CA Certificate Announcement, Certificate Announcement, Revocation Announcement, and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Announcement) utilize the status codes 201 and 202 to identify whether the received information was processed.
While "Redirection 3xx" status codes MAY be supported by implementations, clients should only be enabled to automatically follow them after careful consideration of possible security implications. As described in Section 5, "301 Moved Permanently" could be misused for permanent denial of service.
All applicable "Client Error 4xx" or "Server Error 5xx" status codes MAY be used to inform the client about errors.
Media Type
The Internet Media Type "application/pkixcmp" MUST be set in the HTTP Content-Type header field when conveying a PKIMessage.
Communication Workflow
In CMP, most communication is initiated by the EEs where every CMP request triggers a CMP response message from the CA or RA.
The CMP Announcement messages described in Section 3.7 are an exception. Their creation may be triggered by certain events or done on a regular basis by a CA. The recipient of the Announcement only replies with an HTTP status code acknowledging the receipt or indicating an error, but not with a CMP response.
If the receipt of an HTTP request is not confirmed by receiving an HTTP response, it MUST be assumed that the transferred CMP message was not successfully delivered to its destination.
HTTP Request-URI
The Request-URI is formed as specified in RFC3986.
A server implementation MUST handle Request-URI paths, with or without a trailing slash, as identical.
An example of a Request-Line and a Host header field in an HTTP/1.1 header, sending a CMP request to a server, located in the "/cmp" path of the host "example.com", would be
POST /cmp HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com
or in the absoluteURI form
POST http://example.com/cmp/ HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com
Pushing of Announcements
A CMP server may create event-triggered announcements or generate them on a regular basis. It MAY utilize HTTP transfer to convey them to a suitable recipient. In this use case, the CMP server acts as an HTTP client, and the recipient needs to utilize an HTTP server. As no request messages are specified for those announcements, they can only be pushed to the recipient.
If an EE wants to poll for a potential CA Key Update Announcement or the current CRL, a PKI Information Request using a General Message as described in Appendix E.5 of RFC4210 can be used.
When pushing Announcement messages, PKIMessage structures are sent as the entity-body of an HTTP POST request.
Suitable recipients for CMP announcements might, for example, be repositories storing the announced information, such as directory services. Those services listen for incoming messages, utilizing the same HTTP Request-URI scheme as defined in Section 3.6.
The following PKIMessages are announcements that may be pushed by a CA. The prefixed numbers reflect ASN.1 numbering of the respective element.
[15] CA Key Update Announcement [16] Certificate Announcement [17] Revocation Announcement [18] CRL Announcement
CMP Announcement messages do not require any CMP response. However, the recipient MUST acknowledge receipt with an HTTP response having an appropriate status code and an empty body. When not receiving such a response, it MUST be assumed that the delivery was not successful. If applicable, the sending side MAY try sending the Announcement again after waiting for an appropriate time span.
If the announced issue was successfully stored in a database or was already present, the answer MUST be an HTTP response with a "201 Created" status code and an empty message body.
In case the announced information was only accepted for further processing, the status code of the returned HTTP response MAY also be "202 Accepted". After an appropriate delay, the sender may then try to send the Announcement again and may repeat this until it receives a confirmation that it has been successfully processed. The appropriate duration of the delay and the option to increase it between consecutive attempts should be carefully considered.
A receiver MUST answer with a suitable 4xx or 5xx HTTP error code when a problem occurs.
HTTP Considerations
While all defined features of the HTTP protocol are available to implementations, they SHOULD keep the protocol utilization as simple as possible. For example, there is no benefit in using chunked Transfer-Encoding, as the length of an ASN.1 sequence is known when starting to send it.
There is no need for the clients to send an "Expect" request-header field with the "100-continue" expectation and wait for a "100 Continue" status as described in Section 8.2.3 of RFC2616. The CMP payload sent by a client is relatively small, so having extra messages exchanged is inefficient, as the server will only seldom reject a message without evaluating the body.
Implementation Considerations
Implementors should be aware that implementations might exist that use a different approach for transferring CMP over HTTP, because this document has been under development for more than a decade. Further, implementations based on earlier drafts of this document might use an unregistered "application/pkixcmp-poll" MIME type.
Security Considerations
The following aspects need to be considered by implementers and users:
1. There is the risk for denial-of-service attacks through resource
consumption by opening many connections to an HTTP server. Therefore, idle connections should be terminated after an appropriate timeout; this may also depend on the available free resources. After sending a CMP Error Message, the server should close the connection, even if the CMP transaction is not yet fully completed.
2. Without being encapsulated in effective security protocols, such
as Transport Layer Security (TLS) RFC5246, there is no integrity protection at the HTTP protocol level. Therefore, information from the HTTP protocol should not be used to change state of the transaction.
3. Client users should be aware that storing the target location of
an HTTP response with the "301 Moved Permanently" status code could be exploited by a man-in-the-middle attacker trying to block them permanently from contacting the correct server.
4. If no measures to authenticate and protect the HTTP responses to
pushed Announcement messages are in place, their information regarding the Announcement's processing state may not be trusted. In that case, the overall design of the PKI system must not depend on the Announcements being reliably received and processed by their destination.
5. CMP provides inbuilt integrity protection and authentication.
The information communicated unencrypted in CMP messages does not contain sensitive information endangering the security of the PKI when intercepted. However, it might be possible for an eavesdropper to utilize the available information to gather confidential technical or business critical information. Therefore, users of the HTTP transfer for CMP might want to consider using HTTP over TLS according to RFC2818 or virtual private networks created, for example, by utilizing Internet Protocol Security according to RFC4301. Compliant implementations MUST support TLS with the option to authenticate both server and client.
IANA Considerations
The IANA has already registered the MIME media type "application/ pkixcmp" for identifying CMP sequences due to an request made in connection with RFC2510.
No further action by the IANA is necessary for this document or any anticipated updates.
Acknowledgments
Amit Kapoor and Ronald Tschlaer were the original authors of this document, and their version focused on the so-called "TCP-Based Management Protocol", which has been removed from this document. Their contact data, as originally stated by them, is as follows:
Amit Kapoor Certicom 25801 Industrial Blvd Hayward, CA US Email: [email protected]
Ronald Tschalaer Certicom 25801 Industrial Blvd Hayward, CA US Email: [email protected]
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of various members of the IETF PKIX working group and the ICSA CA-talk mailing list (a list solely devoted to discussing CMP interoperability efforts).
By providing ideas, giving hints, and doing invaluable review work, the following alphabetically listed individuals have significantly contributed to this document:
Tomas Gustavsson, Primekey Peter Gutmann, University of Auckland Wolf-Dietrich Moeller, Nokia Siemens Networks
References
Normative References
[ITU.X690.1994]
International Telecommunications Union, "Information
Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Basic
Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER) and
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)", ITU-T Recommendation
X.690, 1994.
RFC1945 Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and H. Frystyk, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.0", RFC 1945, May 1996.
RFC2119 Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
RFC2510 Adams, C. and S. Farrell, "Internet X.509 Public Key
Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocols", RFC
2510, March 1999.
RFC2616 Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
RFC3986 Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, RFC 3986, January 2005.
RFC4210 Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
"Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
Management Protocol (CMP)", RFC 4210, September 2005.
Informative References
RFC2818 Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", RFC 2818, May 2000.
RFC4301 Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, December 2005.
RFC5246 Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", RFC 5246, August 2008.
Authors' Addresses
Tomi Kause SSH Communications Security Takomotie 8 Helsinki 00380 Finland
EMail: [email protected]
Martin Peylo Nokia Siemens Networks Linnoitustie 6 Espoo 02600 Finland
EMail: [email protected]
